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ABSTRACT
Changes in the competitive environment of the helicopter industry have forced
helicopter manufacturers to respond to increasing global competition and increasing rates
of innovation to meet customers' needs. In many of these organizations, senior managers
have directed their development organizations to reduce development cycle time and cost
by more than 30%. Establishing and implementing this change effort requires a problem
solving methodology that is tailored to the unique needs of development organizations.
This thesis proposes a methodology to address the problem of development cycle
time reduction. The methodology is presented in a general format to ensure its
applicability to a wide range of industries, and is based on the following three concepts:
1. A systems view of the "Rework Cycle" provides valuable insight as to where
to focus improvement efforts.
2. A queuing network model is an effective tool to analyze the current
development process and to explore potential changes.
3. The cycle time reduction effort should concurrently investigate both
incremental and radical changes through the use of cross-functional teams.
As an application of the proposed methodology, this thesis chronicles a major
American helicopter manufacturer's efforts to confront the challenges of reducing
development time for derivative helicopters. Specifically, this thesis focuses on a critical
element of the helicopter development process: the design and fabrication of electrical
and avionics wiring harnesses.
The company's efforts to reduce development cycle time are described in detail as
well as further improvement recommendations. One recommendation calls for the
establishment of design-planning teams as a means of achieving improved process
performance. Many of the proposed changes will depend on management's ability to
lead a large-scale, difficult change effort in both the technological and social systems
within the organization.
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1. Introduction
This thesis proposes a methodology to aid project managers in reducing product
development cycle time. In Section 1, a framework for the entire thesis will be provided,
beginning with a statement of the problem and justification for research into development
cycle time reduction. This section will detail the objectives of the research and provide a
road map for the presentation of the arguments and ideas stated within this thesis. This
section concludes with an overview of the remaining chapters.
1.1. Statement of the problem
Many companies have realized that competing on time is becoming as important
as competing on quality or cost. Companies can no longer dictate the lead time of their
products, but must deliver them when their customers want them. Customers are also
demanding that products be tailored to meet their specific needs, a requirement which is
forcing companies to confront challenges such as customization. Increasing global
competition and a growing rate of technological innovation have also increased the
demand for new features, which has created even shorter product life cycles. For these
reasons, reducing product development cycle time has become a primary focus for
improvement efforts in many companies.
The product development process is often on the critical path in the realization of
new products. Moreover, with the increasing need for customization of existing products,
the development process is also becoming a large part of lead time of what were once
standardized products. Unfortunately, however, development processes that focus on
customization have unique characteristics which defy the use of traditional continuous
improvement tools to reduce cycle time. Most development projects are dynamic and
iterative, ranging from months to even years. By their very nature, their end results are
unique, therefore the development process is never exactly replicated. As such, many of
the tools and techniques presented in continuous improvement methodologies are not
applicable to mass customization. Furthermore, customization requires very different
organizational structures, values, management roles and systems, learning methods, and
ways of relating to customers.' Invariably, customized products require the contribution
of many people whose skills span different functional disciplines---disciplines which are
often strongly tied to ever changing technologies. Typically, these functions do not
interact or come together in the same sequence every time. At times, the success of a
product development process can also depend on the creativity of its members. While
there is often some amount of repeatable tasks, successful product development will
always require a significant degree of innovation. For these reasons, product
development is an ambiguous process, hard to define and even harder to improve.
Even faced with these challenges, the upper management of many companies are
setting aggressive improvement goals for their development organizations, directing them
to reduce development cycle time by 30% or more. These ambitious cycle time goals,
coupled with the difficulties of improving a large and complex development process,
requires a focused and well planned effort that integrates the contributions of many
people throughout the company. In addition, creating and guiding such a cycle time
reduction effort to an effective solution and a successful implementation requires a
problem solving methodology that is tailored to the unique needs of this type of problem.
1.2. Goal of the research project and focusing assumptions
This thesis presents a methodology which addresses the specific problem of
product development cycle time. The methodology is based on three key concepts. The
first concept is that a systems dynamics model of the rework-cycle provides invaluable
intuition as to where to focus development cycle time reduction efforts for complex
development projects.
The second concept is that a quantitative model of the current development
process provides a critical tool in a cycle time reduction effort. Specifically, a queuing
network model is appropriate for this type of problem because it demonstrates the
I Andrew C. Boynton and Joseph Pine II, "Making Mass Customization Work," Harvard Business Review,
September-October (1993): 108-119.
significant effects of many tasks vying for the attention of limited engineering and
technical resources.
The third concept described in the methodology is that development cycle time
reduction efforts should concurrently investigate both incremental and radical changes.
This thesis argues that the path leading to incremental change differs considerably from
the path leading to radical change. There are benefits to conducting two separate efforts
to explore both paths. In addition, the end result, which can combine both types of
change, may prove to be the optimal solution.
1.3. Thesis background
This thesis is based on a seven month internship sponsored by United
Technologies Corporation's Sikorsky Aircraft in conjunction with the Leaders for
Manufacturing program at MIT. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation is aggressively pursuing
cycle time reduction in an effort to increase sales of its S70 helicopter. At one time, the
helicopter industry was somewhat immune to the pressures of cycle time reduction, mass
customization, and shorter lead times. Today, however, with military spending on new
rotorcraft on a seemingly irreversible downward slide, helicopter manufacturers are
tailoring their operations to be more responsive to customers' needs.2 This thesis
describes and contributes to the cycle time reduction effort in Sikorsky's Developmental
Manufacturing Center II (DMC II), which is responsible for the design and delivery of
new and customized S70 helicopters.
The task of designing and building a new or derivative aircraft presents a massive
undertaking; therefore, this thesis focuses on a single key element, the development
process of the wiring harness assemblies.
The cycle time reduction project at Sikorsky provides a detailed case study of the
application of both radical and incremental reduction efforts. Prior to the start of this
study, Sikorsky had already made radical process and structural changes. The process
changes transformed a sequential development process into a more parallel and
2 Robert Ropelewski, "The Helicopter Industry: About to implode?," Aerospace America, April (1996):
38-43.
concurrent process whereby manufacturing engineering could start their planning based
on preliminary data released by the design engineers. The structural changes created a
new department, the DMC II-a cross-functional team headed by one manager with the
authority to allocate resources over a wide range of development projects.
My primary role within the cycle time reduction effort was to study the harness
development process, examine the effectiveness of their radical changes to date, and
recommend and implement additional changes that would further reduce development
cycle time and cost. Consequently, it provided me with an excellent opportunity to
formulate and apply a general cycle time reduction methodology that could be used in a
variety of different industries.
This thesis has three goals. The first goal is to describe a general methodology to
attack the problem of reducing product development cycle time. The second goal is to
use the project at Sikorsky as a case study to examine the effectiveness of the proposed
methodology. The third goal is to discuss the lessons learned with respect to Sikorsky's
use of cross-functional teams to reduce product development cycle time, and how these
lessons might apply to large-scale design and construction processes.
1.4. Thesis layout
The thesis is organized into eight chapters to address the three goals listed above.
Chapter 2 addresses the first goal by describing a general methodology to reduce product
development cycle time. Chapters 3-6 address the second goal by detailing the cycle time
reduction effort within Sikorsky. The final two chapters address the third goal with a
discussion of the lessons learned from Sikorsky's use of cross-functional teams and how
these lessons apply to the construction industry.
* Chapter 2 describes the methodology in general terms. The methodology is
based on a "systems view" of the rework cycle and argues the benefits of
concurrently pursuing both incremental and radical change. In addition, this
methodology can be used as a guide for similar product development cycle time
reduction projects.
* Chapter 3 describes the cycle time reduction effort in Sikorsky's Development
Manufacturing Center II. It also details the electrical wiring development process
and the organization that was in place at the time of the study.
* Chapter 4 applies the cycle time reduction methodology presented in Chapter 2
to the harness development process in the DMC II. It also describes a queuing
network model that was used in the pursuit of further incremental improvement.
The benefits of this model over existing tools such as Gantt charts, Critical Path
Methods, and Pert diagrams are outlined.
* Chapter 5 describes in more detail the approaches that were taken at Sikorsky in
pursuit of further incremental and radical process improvement. It also describes
a final integrated solution to the harness cycle-time reduction problem-the
implementation of design-planning teams.
* Chapter 6 details the implementation plan for design-planning teams to further
reduce harness development cycle time. Tradeoffs between design-planning
teams and functional teams are discussed, and a final harness development
organizational structure is proposed.
* Chapter 7 focuses on the organizational issues surrounding implementing
process improvement in the "team" environment existing within the DMC II. It
will also discuss the challenges associated with using teams in a downsizing
environment.
* Chapter 8 describes the lessons learned from the project at Sikorsky and how
these might apply to the construction industry. It will focus on the similarities
between large-scale customized helicopter development and the
design/development process in the construction industry.

2. Methodology for product development cycle time
reduction
Companies have identified that time to market is a key competitive advantage and
have set ambitious goals to reduce the cycle time of their product development processes.
The first step towards attaining these goals is to define and implement an appropriate
methodology for the development cycle time reduction problem. A methodology that
will take a company from an urgent need to reduce cycle time, to a definitive strategy that
has a realistic chance of achieving improvement targets. This thesis argues that the most
efficient way to reach this point depends on the organization's ability to identify the
"systemic forces" influencing their working environment, quickly investigate a wide
range of options, and then establish consensus on a vision for the future.
In this chapter, general elements of a development cycle time reduction
methodology are outlined in detail (Figure 2-1). Chapter 4 will apply this methodology
to the harness development cycle time reduction project at Sikorsky. The elements of the
methodology are described in general terms to ensure their applicability to a wide range
of product development projects beyond the helicopter industry.
Figure 2-1: General development cycle time reduction methodology.
2.1. Develop a "systems view" of the working environment
Before the start of any cycle time reduction effort, it is imperative that all
players have a clear understanding of the system within which they work. This ensures
that limited company resources such as time, people, and money are targeted for the right
project and also at the right areas or "pressure points" within that project. The field of
"systems thinking" provides a valuable framework that aids managers in ensuring well
targeted improvement efforts. In The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge writes that "by
developing the capability to see the forest and the trees, companies will be in a position to
respond powerfully to the challenge of complexity and change."' This thesis argues that
the first step that should be taken in any cycle time reduction effort should be the
formulation of a "systems view" of the development environment. Senge also argues
that mastering the language of systems thinking first requires knowledge of other
important disciplines such as personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, and team
learning. These disciplines combine together to create what he refers to as the "learning
organization." As Figure 2-1 suggests, the inherent dynamic nature of a "systems view"
will require a flexible, working model, continually updated and validated to reflect
inevitable changes.
Since the 1980s, the field of System Dynamics has proven significant to
understanding the complex nature of development projects. The concept of the "Rework
Cycle" is well described in the work of Kenneth G. Cooper, where he has used its basic
structure to model numerous software, construction, electronic systems, and aerospace
development projects. The robust nature of the rework cycle makes it particularly
applicable to the development environment within Sikorsky's Development
Manufacturing Center II. A thorough understanding of the "Rework Cycle" as described
by Cooper is essential in the creation of a "systems view" of the development
environment--the first element of the development cycle time reduction methodology
proposed by this thesis.
3 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York:
Doubleday, 1990): 310.
Even with all of the recent advances in project management systems and tools,
managers of large projects continue to get surprised by rework which can result in cost
overruns, late deliveries, scarce resources and contract disputes. Unfortunately,
conventional project management methods such as the Critical Path Method (CPM) and
Gantt charts treat a project as being composed of a set of individual, discrete tasks. Each
task is portrayed as having a definable beginning and end, with the work content either
"work to be accomplished," "work being accomplished," or "work accomplished." Little
account is taken of the quality of the work completed, the release of incomplete or
imperfect sub-tasks, or the amount of rework which will be required. These conventional
methods are particularly inappropriate for development projects, in which there is a
naturally iterative process of design, engineering, and manufacturing. More experienced
managers understand the impact of rework and typically build "slack time" into their
schedules to account for it. Still, however, the accuracy of these schedules depend on the
experience, expertise, and sometimes luck of the individual managers and rarely reflect
the actual cycle time of the project.
A model that recognizes rework, plans for it, monitors it, and helps managers
reduce its magnitude and duration can be of great value to development organizations.
The "Rework Cycle" model "reflects a more strategic view of projects, and accounts for
the quality of work done and the causes of productivity variations."4 Unlike traditional
methods, it creates a clearer picture of the effects that management actions can have on
staff productivity and the quantity of rework-and how the consequences spread through
an entire project. The framework is quite dissimilar to CPM/PERT models; "it treats a
project not merely as a sum of a sequence of discrete tasks, but as flows of work in which
there are multiple rework cycles."' The following paragraphs will describe the
underlying structure of Cooper's "Rework Cycle" in detail.
4 Kenneth G. Cooper, "The Rework Cycle: Why Projects are Mismanaged," PMNETwork, February 1993.
5 Ibid.
2.1.1. The traditional development project view
Typically, development projects are tracked based on work to be accomplished,
work being accomplished, or work accomplished. The first step in creating a more
realistic view of development projects is to model the process as a more continuous
stream of work as shown below:
Figure 2-2: Traditional view of development projects.
At the start of a project, all work resides in the pool of work to be
accomplished. As these tasks are drained over time, they flow through work being
accomplished, such that at the end of the project all the tasks fill the stock of work
accomplished. This model can be taken a step further by recognizing that as a project
progresses, changing levels of manpower working at varying levels of productivity
ultimately determines the pace of work being accomplished.
Manpower Productivity
Figure 2-3: Traditional view with factors affecting work being accomplished.
2.1.2. View of development project which recognizes quality and rework
A more accurate view of development projects recognizes the existence of
rework cycles. Below, what Cooper terms the quality of work executed should be
thought of as a "valve" controlling the portion of the work flow being accomplished that
will or will not require rework.
Manpower Productivity Quality
Figure 2-4: Development project view which includes the "Rework Cycle. "
Unlike other program analysis tools and systems, the rework cycle recognizes the
real-world phenomenon that work is "executed" at varying quality levels. Potentially
ranging from 0 to 1, the valve of quality depends on many variable conditions in the
project and company. The fractional value of quality determines the portion of the work
being accomplished that will enter the pool of work actually accomplished, which will
never again need re-doing.
The distinction between productivity and quality is important. People may
exhibit high productivity, but be putting out work of low quality that requires later re-
working. In this condition, the net throughput to the pool of work actually accomplished
is low.
2.1.3. View of development project which recognizes undiscovered rework
In reality there is a critical "buffer" in which rework lingers until it is
identified as needing rework. Cooper has termed this buffer undiscovered rework, which
consists of "those tasks or work products that contain as-yet-undetected errors of
commission or omissions, and are therefore perceived, and reported by all traditional
°
systems, as being done."6 The errors are usually detected by downstream efforts or
testing. This rework discovery may occur months or even years later, during which time
dependent work has incorporated these errors. The more tightly-coupled and parallel the
project tasks are, the greater the effect on subsequent rework cycles will be.
Once discovered, the known rework demands the application of resources,
beyond those needed for executing the original work. Executed rework enters the flow of
work being accomplished, subject to similar productivity and quality variations. Even




Figure 2-5: Development project view which includes undiscovered rework. 7
For project management success, it is imperative that undiscovered rework be
acknowledged, aggressively sought out, and prevented as much as possible. Cooper
argues that all development plans and schedules should be set accordingly so as to reduce
the disruption of the surprise of undiscovered rework. Furthermore, a culture should be
cultivated in which early discovery of rework is encouraged.
6 Ibid.
7 Structure adapted from "The Rework Cycle: Benchmarks for the Project Manager," Proiect Management
Journal, March, 1993.
2.2. Target areas for improvement
Having developed a "systems view" of the development environment, managers,
process owners, or teams can now specifically target areas for improvement. As
identified in Cooper's view of the "Rework Cycle" these areas or "pressure points"
include manpower, productivity, quality, and rework discovery. The challenge of
successful project management and development cycle time improvements focuses on
maintaining an optimal balance among these four variables. Often, improvements in one
area can lead to increased problems in others. Chapter 4 will discuss the tradeoffs of
these variables and how they apply to the harness development process at Sikorsky.
2.3. Pursue both incremental and radical improvement
Now that team members share a common view of the system within which they
work, and specific "high payoff' areas have been targeted for improvement, the quest for
reduced cycle time can follow two fundamentally different paths, 1) exploring many
incremental changes to the current development process, or 2) searching for a radical
redefinition of the development process by changing some or all of its basic structural
elements. The premise made in this thesis is that although both of these paths will likely
lead to quite different solutions, sound reasons exist for investigating both paths
concurrently. The primary reason is that at the start of the investigation there is no way to
guarantee that the current development process will be able to achieve the desired goals.
This assumption stems from the concept that an infrastructure underlies the current
process. Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark propose a definition for infrastructure: it is
composed of the systems, practices and policies that drive an organization's behavior.8
Whereas Hayes et al. present a list of infrastructure elements within a manufacturing
organization, that list can be modified slightly to fit a product development environment
by including the following elements:
1. Human resource policies and practices, including management selection and
training.
8 Hayes, Robert H., Wheelwright, Steven C. and Clark, Kim B., Dynamic Manufacturing: Creating the
Learning Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 362.
2. Quality assurance and control systems.
3. Work scheduling and document control systems.
4. Performance measurement and reward systems.
5. Organization structure and design.
Incremental change will modify the process itself but.may not get to the root of
the organization--the infrastructure elements. If the infrastructure has an inherent limit or
creates a sufficient drag on the performance of the organization, then achieving the cycle
time target without impacting these elements may prove too costly or inefficient.
The best possible chance of meeting cycle time goals requires concurrently
investigating incremental and radical process improvements. If only a single path is
followed, it could result in a proposed solution that is insufficient to meet the cycle time
goals, and the exercise must begin again. More likely, there will be no accurate way to
judge the true merit of the proposed solution. The exercise may generate enough
momentum behind the proposal and the organization will expend a significant amount of
effort implementing a poor solution. Thus, the rationale behind this step in the
methodology is to reduce the risk of implementing an inefficient or inadequate solution.
2.3.1. Cycle time reduction tools
Although the radical and incremental improvement paths fundamentally differ,
they both address the issue of cycle time within the same organization that designs and
manufactures the same product. Therefore, both investigations can share a number of
common tools and resources. Both paths include the following:
Cross-functional teams: The most important element of cycle time reduction
consists of the members of the process improvement team. In the case in which the
development process extends beyond a single function, the cycle time reduction team
must be staffed with people from the affected functions. A cross-functional team proves
crucial for two reasons. First, only by involving experts from each function will the team
develop a true understanding of the current process and the potential alternative. Second,
this methodology aims not only to find the most appropriate solution, but also to create
the momentum and support within the organization to implement change as quickly as
possible. The most effective way to build this support within the groups and
organizations that will ultimately be impacted, is to use the team members as the core
change agents. For both of these reasons, the team members must have not only intimate
knowledge of the development process, but also the respect and leverage within the
organization to effect change.
Detailed definition of the current process: The team should start the study by
developing a shared understanding of the current process and the detailed steps in each
functional area. This is a crucial exercise because within a multi-function development
process it is very likely that each team member will initially come to the meetings
focused solely on the needs of his or her function. Both paths to a solution involve
negotiation and compromise between functions, which requires that all team members
must first develop an understanding of each other's needs, the functional design
processes, and the interfaces and dependencies between functions. Even more important
is the development of mutual respect between the team members and the shared belief
that all functional groups provide valuable contributions to the process.
Analytical model of the design tasks: A complex development process will often
span many months and touch numerous individuals. Amid all of this detail, it is essential
to develop a broad and basic model of the product development process. Ideally, this
model should be as simple as possible yet still describe all of the essential elements.
These elements include the basic development tasks, the resources applied to these tasks,
and the dependence, order, and sizes of the different development tasks. Finally, because
the goal of the exercise is to address cycle time, the analytical model must capture the
effects of these elements on the total cycle time of the development project.
The analytical model has two primary purposes: communication and evaluation.
In order for individuals to operate effectively in this type of team, they must develop a
common understanding of the entire scope of the development process. The complexity
and specialized detail of each individual function acts as a barrier to fostering effective
cross-functional discussion. In addition, the combined complexity of all the functions
makes it difficult to discuss the development process as a whole. The task of developing
a relatively simple model of the process provides an effective mechanism with which to
identify the key elements of the process. In addition, any large scale changes will require
the approval of people outside the study team, most often upper managers, who have very
little knowledge of the entire development process. Defining a simple, yet robust, model
which defines the development is an effective way to communicate the current process
and the proposed changes. Effective communication to people outside the team is the key
to first getting approval for implementing the changes and then spreading the vision of
the future to the people who must enact the change.
Finally, there will be many conflicting suggestions and opinions about the effects
of potential changes and strategies. An analytical model serves as a tool that can judge
the potential gains and costs of the changes. This analysis is often crucial in order to
achieve consensus within the process improvement team. In addition, some amount of
analysis is required for obtaining upper management buy-in, particularly when the
proposed changes are broad and affect a number of organizations.
Before the exercise can proceed to the next stage, the cross-functional teams, the
definition of the current process, and the analytical model must be sufficiently refined.
Such refinement can be achieved when a cross-functional team 1) has been chartered and
is functioning effectively; 2) has documented in detail the current process; and 3) has
achieved consensus on an analytical model. The next stage will start by dividing the
effort and the people into two sub-teams, each pursuing either an incremental or radical
path.
2.3.2. Pursuit of incremental change
The primary purpose of this path is to examine the process at a detailed level, then
generate many proposals for separate changes to the process, and, finally, integrate the
most effective changes into a single, faster process with fewer rework iterations. This
new process must be developed in sufficient detail so that team members can describe it
to people outside the team, because those people will be expected to quickly implement
the changes in their daily activities.
2.3.3. Pursuit of radical change
The purpose of this path is to discover and evaluate new ideas that will change the
fundamental infrastructure of the development process. A single sub-team is formed to
travel this path. This team begins with a broad understanding of the development
process, which was gained by creating the analytical model of the current process.
Through reengineering efforts, the team attempts to define a more efficient, faster
development process.
2.4. Integrate findings, implement change, and refine
Having developed two complete proposals for change, the next step requires
integrating both sets of ideas into a single implementation plan. It is important in this
step not to lose sight of the "systemic view" of the development environment that was
discussed earlier. This may prove as simple as accepting both proposals and laying out
all of the tasks needed to implement both sets of changes. More likely, though, the
integration process will involve negotiation and compromise on both proposals. This
integrated solution can then be implemented throughout the organization if the required
amount of momentum, acceptance, commitment and responsibility are achieved.
In order to transition this exercise from the investigation of the cycle time
reduction problem, to a successful implementation of change, this final integration of
ideas must also accomplish the following goals:
1. Gain acceptance at all levels of the organization.
2. Gather momentum for implementing change.
3. Gain commitment of upper management to support the change.
4. Create change agents who accept personal responsibility for making the
change happen.
These goals, in fact, underlie every step in the methodology, and many of the
earlier activities have laid the ground work for a transition from studying the problem to
implementing a solution. Therefore, even while engaging in the generation of new
concepts, the team members must think ahead to the time when some of their ideas will
be implemented and how these changes will influence the overall development system,
specifically, the "Rework Cycle." This means that throughout the exercise, the sub-teams
should be integrating their ideas, presenting them to upper management and the rest of
the organization, and imagining what role each team member will play in the
implementation. It is crucial that the team members believe that this exercise serves not
simply as a study, but rather as the first step towards implementing change.
3. Cycle time reduction of the S70 helicopter
In order to set the stage for the analysis in the following chapters, this chapter will
outline the motivation for cycle time reduction at Sikorsky Aircraft and then describe the
current wiring harness development process and organization.
Examining cycle time reduction of the S70 helicopter provides a unique
opportunity to study a construction project that is carried out on a scale that dwarfs many
conventional commercial products. Like most complex, large-scale projects, the S70
development process can be broken into distinct sub-processes, each of which offers a
sufficiently large scope to examine the issues of product development. One of these sub-
processes, the electrical and avionics wiring development, is the basis of the data for this
thesis.
This thesis focuses solely on the sustaining product development process, and
does not include the original design work that created the first S70 aircraft. It simply
encompasses the development activity expended to customize an S70 for a new customer.
It still, however, is a large scale design and manufacturing effort that will be repeated
numerous times--hopefully for several decades to come. In addition, each iteration is
very similar in types of activities and amount of labor. As a repeatable activity, the S70
harness development process provides a perfect opportunity to analyze a relatively stable
development process and then propose changes that can be applied and refined over a
number of future projects.
3.1. Cycle time reduction at Sikorsky
At a 1995 UTC Executive Conference in Hartford CT, the President and CEO of
United Technologies, George David, emphasized the importance of continuous
improvement within UTC, and expressed his fanaticism with the kaizen process. He
stated that "kaizen proves to our employees, and to all of us, the leverage of breakthrough
thinking. Kaizen blows up barriers, questions the unquestionable, and slaughters sacred
cows." At the time of this project, Sikorsky had embraced the kaizen process and had
established an Agile Manufacturing Department responsible for training and
implementing kaizen principles.
In Sikorsky's pre-kaizen training course, the Agile Manufacturing Department
clearly highlights the challenges that Sikorsky is facing in the helicopter market. With
reduction in U.S. military purchases and cost plus pricing, Sikorsky is focused on
reducing costs to ensure its success in the price-sensitive commercial market. Benchmark
information, supplied by the Agile Manufacturing Department, indicated that competitor
products typically cost 30% less to produce in 40% less time. Consequently, in order to
remain competitive in an increasingly tight market, Sikorsky Aircraft identified cycle
time and cost reduction as measurable goals to increase sales of S70 aircraft. To confront
this challenge, Sikorsky created a new department, the Development Manufacturing
Center II, which was chartered to "provide tailored-to-contract processes based on
concurrent design principles that could flexibly develop alternate helicopter
configurations to satisfy customer requirements." More specifically, the DMC II's
mission was to "perform design, systems integration, test, manufacturing, and
installations of low quantity modifications, inclusive of proof-of-principle, prototype, and
development programs, drawing upon the technical skills of Sikorsky Aircraft using
tailored processes which yield high quality products at a competitive cost."
Faced with fewer U.S. military purchases and tighter program budgets, the DMC
II was challenged to take 30% out of the cost of producing derivative and modified
helicopters; a remarkable challenge, considering the significant amount of design activity,
performed by every engineering discipline, that was needed for each new customer to
incorporate unique combinations of standard and non-standard options. For instance the






Figure 3-1:. Configuration for two development programs.
This design effort, while small relative to the initial development, is a complex task that
involves numerous engineers and technicians and can require thousands of person hours
of redesign for a single customer.
Typically, S70 derivative customer orders have taken in excess of 18 months
from initial implementation until delivery. This long delay means that customers are
forced to commit millions of dollars on a helicopter and then wait nearly two years for
delivery. The long cycle time also means that Sikorsky makes commitments to its
suppliers resulting in larger work-in-process (WIP) inventories. Consequently, to remain
competitive in this market, the DMC II was challenged to drastically reduce development
cycle time and cost for derivative S70 helicopters.
3.2. S70 Wiring harness development
3.2.1. Wiring Harness Process
The wiring system that connects all the helicopter's electrical and computer
systems has the largest amount of variation from one customer to the next. The S70 can
have as much as 24,000 to 48,000 feet of loose wiring segments depending on the options
included in the platform. With the existing design, approximately one third of all these
wire bundles undergoes some modification with each new customer. This involves
numerous engineering releases, and often requires expenditures of thousands of person
hours, depending on the size and complexity of the customer requirements.
The harness development for each new customer encompasses nine major stages:
generation of wiring diagrams, harness EPATS design, production illustration, harness
manufacturing planning, wire cutting and coding, 2-D T105 tool construction, harness
fabrication, harness installation planning, and installation. For each harness, the sequence
of these stages is relatively sequential except for wire cutting/coding and T105 tool
construction which are typically performed concurrently.
1. Generation of wiring schematics: The primary responsibility of the
electrical and avionics designers is to design every aspect of the wiring system
associated with each customer order. The design describes every aspect of
each wiring system and provides the necessary information needed to
requisition all material (except for the length of wire).
2. Harness EPATS design: This task begins with the input of the electrical
systems schematics,( i.e., the definition of all the electrical components and
their pin to pin connections) into Sikorsky's Electrical Planning and Tooling
System (EPATS). The primary output of this activity constitutes the complete
design of all the wiring harnesses in the aircraft. EPATS interfaces with
Sikorsky's MRP II system (IMPACT II) and generates an engineering bill of
material that will requisition parts.
3. Production illustration: This step has been eliminated by the DMC II in
order to save limited engineering resources on producing detailed installation
drawings to build only one or two aircraft. Engineers, still, however, through
past experience and existing drawings are required to provide a detailed stick
diagram of the harness layout depicting routing information and wire lengths.
When there is still too much uncertainty in the exact harness routing path,
engineers will make long wire estimates which will require connectors to be
terminated in the aircraft during harness installation.
4. Harness manufacturing planning: Length data for each wire is manually
entered into a computer program that will automatically generate a two
dimensional stick diagram for each harness assembly. This stick is then
manipulated (bent) on a 2-D drawing program so that its full-size print out will
fit on 3'x 8' harness board sections. The harness planner also details the
fabrication plan that defines the steps, processes, and sequence of all the
individual tasks associated with fabricating the harnesses on the boards.
5. Wire cutting and coding: For each harness, a wire cutting work order is
entered into the MRP II system that will generate a requirement for wires to be
cut and coded at the Avionics Systems Center in Shelton, CT. EPATS data is
directly transferred to automated CAPRIS wire cutting machines. The wires
are then transported back to Stratford for harness fabrication.
6. 2-D T105 tool construction: The 2-D drawings created by the harness
planners are manually attached to 3' x 8' plywood boards to create a harness
board. Clips and pins are added to the boards at specified locations to support
the routing of wires.
7. Harness fabrication: Hourly technicians manually route wires as per the
assembly operation sheets created by the harness planners. Connectors, ties,
and proper shieldings are added to complete the harness assembly. The
harnesses are then inspected after fabrication and typically sent back to
Shelton, CT for DITMCO testing.
8. Harness installation planning: Installation operation sheets are created to
define the steps, processes, and sequence of all the jobs associated with the
installation of the wire harness. (2-D illustration drawings to guide the factory
workers to install the wire harnesses into the airframe are generally not created
in the DMC II. The designer usually goes to the aircraft to answer any
questions the technician installing the harness may have.)
9. Harness installation: This step constitutes the actual installation of the
harnesses into the aircraft. Many of the harnesses are routed based on
engineering guidance during construction. Considerable harness rework occurs
during this step for "first of a kind" harnesses due to uncertainty in wire
routing and wire length data.
3.2.2. Organizational structure
The organizational structure of Sikorsky's Development Operations is divided
into two units, the DMC II and the DMC. The entire organization is overseen by one vice
president responsible for the cost, delivery, and schedule for all development programs.
A second engineering vice president is responsible for both product safety and technical
support for DMC II programs.
3.2.2.1. DMC H organizational structure
The organizational structure within the DMC II is based on a "heavyweight








Figure 3-2: Heavyweight product development organization.'
As a "heavyweight project organization", the DMC II provides the integration,
speed, and coordination benefits associated with true project organizations, but still
retains some of the specialization of Sikorsky's functional departments. Consequently, as
the DMC II grows, it will require more managers and administrators than that of a truly
non-matrix organization. Since the lead functional representatives in the DMC II are
evaluated by only the DMC II manager and not their functional departments, much of the
conflict between balancing functional responsibilities and project responsibilities
(typically associated with true matrix organizations) has been eliminated. With product
development speed being one of the overriding tenants crucial to the success of the DMC
II, the heavyweight project organization model has thus far proven successful in quickly
resolving conflicts between functional representatives and for efficiently coordinating
activities between individuals with different functional backgrounds. Overall, relatively
little time is spent transferring information, assigning responsibilities, and coordinating
tasks between members within the DMC II. Furthermore, over this seven month study,
the DMC II continued to develop and refine its processes thereby further speeding
coordination time. There are, however, challenges confronting the DMC II that are
consistent with organizations modeled along project lines. For example, a project may
only require a portion of an electrical engineer's time for a fraction of the duration of a
9 Adapted from Karl T. Ulrich and Steven D. Eppinger, Product Design and Development (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1995) 27.
project. In the past, Sikorsky had handled this problem by assigning electrical engineers
to a functional department so that several projects could draw on the electrical engineer
resource in exactly the amount needed for a particular project. Today, however, in the
DMC II environment, engineers are expected to take on broader job responsibilities and
flexibly adapt to project needs (sometimes even across multiple projects).
Within the DMC II, platform leaders are identified for each individual program.
These platform leaders are held accountable for all aspects of their program and are
evaluated based on how well their program adheres to safety, compliance, cost and
delivery schedules. In theory, each platform leader has control over all of the critical
resources needed for program success. As depicted in Figure 3-3, these resources
include: manufacturing, manufacturing engineering, industrial engineering, world wide
customer service, product integrity, production control, and engineering.
Development Manufacturing Center II
V.P. Development Operations V. P. Production Engineering
Cost, Schedule, Delivery Product Safety and Technical Support
Deputy, Development Operations
Platform Leader Platform Leader Platform Leader Platform Leader
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Mfg. Eng. Mfg. Eng. Mfg. Eng. Mfg. Eng.
Industrial Eng. Industrial Eng. Industrial Eng. Industrial Eng.
WWCs wwCs wwCs wwCs
Product Integrity Product Integrity Product Integrity Product Integrity
Production Control Production Contro Production Control Production Control
Engineering Engineering Engineering Engineering
Figure 3-3: Development Manufacturing Center II Organizational Chart
Over my seven month stay within the DMC II, the organization nearly doubled in
size and platform leaders began to compete for limited personnel resources. Within the
DMC II, there are individuals who are designated as Core Team Members. Each of the
major functions was headed by a Core Team Member who was considered the process
owner for that particular function. Moreover, they were responsible for interacting with
their old functional organizations to request additional manpower and technical support.
In effect, they served as "working" functional managers within the DMC II. Core Team
Members were not evaluated by their functional departments, but worked directly for the
DMC II manager. The majority of the growth within the DMC II during my tenure was
attributed to the temporary transfer of design engineers to work on new programs for the
DMC II Core Members. These engineers, however, were still evaluated by their
functional organizations and were not considered Core DMC II Team Members.
3.2.2.2. Wiring harness organization structure
The nine major stages of the harness development process are performed by three
departments: the DMC II, the Avionics Systems Center, and the DMC. The DMC II is
responsible for the generation of wiring schematics, EPATS design, production
illustrations, and harness installation planning. The DMC generally completes harness
manufacturing planning, 2-D T105 tool construction, harness fabrication, and harness
installation, while the Avionics Systems Center is responsible for wire cutting and coding
and DITMCO testing.
The organizational structure defining the harness development process is
somewhat complex and is not accurately depicted in the DMC II organizational chart
shown previously. Most programs have one electrical engineer (job classification C5)
with overall responsibility for the EPATS design for that program. At the time of this
study, only one EPATS designer was considered a Core DMC II Member. Others were
brought in temporarily on an "as needed" basis. Some were co-located within the DMC
II; others remained in their functional areas. During my stay, some of the EPATS design
work was even outsourced to a nearby contractor due to perceived manpower constraints.
Similarly, there was only one systems manufacturing engineer who was a Core
DMC II Member. He was identified as the process owner for the portion of the harness
development process that remained after the design was complete. His job was
noticeably challenging because he still had to work across functional barriers to get work
accomplished. For example, harness manufacturing planning, wire cutting, and harness
fabrication were performed by individuals outside of the DMC II who were still evaluated
by their functional organizations.
3.3. Cycle time reduction of wiring harness development
Reducing the cycle time of the harness development process is critical to
achieving the target 30% reduction in aircraft delivery time. Since the electrical and
avionics systems ultimately define the wiring functionality and the airframe structure
defines the geometric space, harness development is forced to come after the electrical
systems, avionics systems, and the aircraft structure have been designed. Historically,
harness development has been the longest individual development process for each
customer, often requiring more than a year to complete for derivative aircraft. In
addition, wiring systems have the highest degree of variation from one customer to the
next, where roughly 1/4 to 1/3 of all wiring harnesses undergo some design modification.
Finally, the harness development process is considered to be the longest segment of the
critical path, spanning over 70% of the total customer order cycle time.
Further reducing cycle time of harness development in the DMC II presents a
number of significant obstacles. First and foremost, harness development is a large and
complex task. The design of each customer's wiring system travels through a year (or
longer) development process and is touched by numerous engineers and technicians.
Each activity depends greatly on data from multiple upstream groups, and its data in turn
feeds a number of downstream activities. This creates a complex web network of
suppliers and customers that differs considerably from project to project. Moreover,
almost no single person understands the entire process because individual workers and
managers have been traditionally measured on their functional needs and requirements.
Even with all of the radical organizational changes made with the formation of the
DMC II, portions of the organization are still split along functional lines. This is
attributed to the fact that historically wiring development has been conducted in a very
serial fashion. One reason for this serial flow was to allow each functional group to
develop a well integrated, aircraft wide solution before passing its data on to the next
function. It also facilitated the development of functional experts who spent years
learning the processes and the dedicated computer tools which optimize their particular
function's development process. This serial flow proved sufficient for production aircraft
and production changes, but was wholly inadequate for the flexibility required in the
DMC II.
Within the fast-paced, mod-shop environment of the DMC II, the functional
mindset creates problems. Although a large amount of design integration is needed
within each function, there are also many issues of design integration across functions
that must be conducted quickly and efficiently in order to meet customer delivery and
cost requirements. For example, the EPATS designer may decide which harness will
connect two components. If he specifies that the connection will be integrated into an
existing wiring harness, he may greatly influence the routing of the harness, which is
within the domain of the engineer designated to provide stick information as well as the
technician tasked to install the harness. Gathering and balancing information from these
downstream customers is crucial to meeting cycle time improvement targets. In the past,
Sikorsky had the luxury of spending considerable amounts of time perfecting designs
prior to releasing them downstream. Similarly, they had the time necessary to follow
detailed engineering change procedures when problems were found with designs. Slow
feedback loops throughout the entire process drove a significant amount of rework into
every functional group thereby considerably lengthening development cycle time. Today,
however, in the DMC II that luxury is no longer feasible. Teamwork and efficient
collaboration between all functions is necessary to meet demanding customer needs. To
date, the DMC II organization has taken enormous strides in breaking down functional
silos; however, silos still do exist.
Amidst all these challenges, the management of the DMC II accepted the goal of
drastically reducing its cycle time. The following chapters integrate the methodology for
addressing development cycle time described in Chapter 2 with the DMC II's harness
development process.

4. Cycle time reduction methodology applied to S70 wiring
harness development
This chapter applies the cycle time reduction methodology presented in Chapter 2
to the harness development process in the DMC II. It also describes a queuing network
model and simulation program that was used in pursuit of further incremental and radical
improvement. The benefits of simulation based on queuing network theory when
addressing development cycle time will be explained by contrasting it to existing project
management tools such as Gantt and PERT charts.
4.1. Develop systems view of harness development process
Using the concept of the "Rework Cycle" described in Chapter 2, the harness
development process can be modeled as follows:
Manpower Productivity Quality
Rework discovery
Figure 4-1: "Rework Cycle" applied to harness development process.
The model shown above keeps account of the harnesses that have been
developed and the work that remains to be done within a development program. For
example, a helicopter development program has two pools of harnesses that need to be
developed. They are:
'· ·'
1. The harnesses initially identified as needing to be developed. The
harnesses in this pool are those which have not been started by engineering.
These harnesses include completely new designs as well as similar designs
used on other programs that will be modified.
2. The backlog of rework. The harnesses in this backlog are those that have
been identified as requiring rework due to engineering changes, inadequate
length information, or a variety of other quality flaws in the fabrication
process.
Similarly, there are two pools of "harnesses developed":
1. Undiscovered rework. The harnesses in this pool have started the
development process and will require revision, but have not yet been identified
as requiring rework. After the need for rework is perceived, these harnesses
become part of the recognized backlog of rework in the pool of "known
rework."
2. Harnesses actually developed. This pool represents harnesses that have been
completed, tested, and will not require revision.
The rate of "harnesses being developed" decreases the harness backlogs and adds
to the levels of completed harnesses. The rate of accomplishment (in terms of harnesses
designed, planned, fabricated, or installed per time period) depends upon the number of
people working and their average productivity. As harnesses are developed, they flow to
"undiscovered rework" or "harnesses actually developed" depending on "quality."
Quality, in this example, represents the fraction of harnesses that will not require rework.
The model represents within its structure the behavior of the principal factors affecting
quality and productivity in each different phase of the harness development process, such
as: manpower skill levels, upstream work availability and correctness, suppliers designs,
material availability, and other organizational conditions. These factors represent the
target locations to focus improvement efforts. Skillful managers provided with adequate
resources will be able to balance these factors to maintain an optimal development effort.
4.2. Target areas to improve harness development cycle time
Having developed a "systems view" of the harness development process, team
members can now specifically target areas for improvement. As shown in Figure 4-1,
these areas include manpower, productivity, quality, and rework discovery. This section
will describe some factors that influence each of these areas and how they pertain to the
DMC II harness development process.
4.2.1. The impact that "manpower" has on harness development
The skills, capabilities, and commitment of the members of a development team
in large measure determine project performance. When the project team is severely
understaffed, performance can sometimes be increased by adding the necessary staff.
Similarly, when the project team is overstaffed, performance can sometimes be increased
by removing staff.
Some books promote the notion of building up personnel on a project as it
progresses." Often, project managers complain that if they only had a few more people,
they would be able to deliver on time. Contrary to this belief, Systems Dynamics models
have shown that increasing personnel during a project can be counterproductive." The
main reason is that adding new people during a project can sometimes increase both the
communications and training overhead, which will lower overall productivity. Since the
time needed to bring someone completely up to speed on a project is usually a significant
portion of the project schedule, it is better to bring the person in at the beginning. It is not
unusual to see staff added in a panic at the end of a project simply to experience further
delays because of the increased coordination requirements. In most projects,
implementing with a fixed number of people will result in a lower cost and faster
completion time. Research has also shown that any given project has an optimal constant
'0 Lawrence H. Putnam and Ware Myers, Measures for Excellence (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Yourdon
Press/Prentice Hall, 1992).
staffing level, and that working either above or below that level will increase the schedule
and budget, or lower the quality of the project. 12
Within the DMC II, the more efficiently run programs maintained one EPATS
designer and one harness planner who worked on the program from beginning to end.
Even greater efficiency was realized when individuals displayed some level of cross-
training and could flexibly be used in either the harness design or manufacturing planning
functions. Other programs which sought outside assistance for EPATS design would
sometimes become overburdened with coordination and monitoring requirements, often
negatively impacting the program's budget and performance.
When harness development ran behind schedule on a specific program, the DMC
II was organized in such a way that it could easily transfer engineering manpower
between programs. This flexibility proved crucial to satisfying customer delivery and
cost requirements. For greater flexibility, the DMC II also offloaded specific engineering
tasks to nearby suppliers during peak demand periods. The outside firms were typically
fast and relatively economical when a set of tasks could be clearly defined and when
coordination requirements were not severe.
4.2.2. Improving "productivity" in harness development
Even more noteworthy than the effect that manpower levels can have on
development cycle performance, are the potential improvements gained through the
efficient use of personnel management, incentive, and reward systems. Traditionally,
policies for hiring, firing, overtime, training, and retention are seldom analyzed in
development programs. Systems Dynamics models have included such diverse effects as
communications overhead, worker overtime, burnout, and schedule pressure." Workers'
productivity and error rates ultimately feed back to affect managers' decisions, forcing
them continually to evaluate hiring, overtime, and scheduling policies.
" Bradley J. Smith, Nghia Nguyen, Richard F. Vidale, "Death of a Software Manager," American
Programmer May 1993: 14.2 Ibid. 14.
" Ibid. 14.
Once again it is important to recognize the interdependence between "manpower,"
"productivity," and "quality." While drastic increases in productivity may be attainable,
many times they are at the expense of quality. For example, instituting a piece rate
compensation system and not tying it directly to quality can quickly result in cost
overruns and second rate products. Likewise, as mentioned in the previous section,
studies have shown that increasing manpower during the development process may
severely hinder overall productivity due to increased communications overhead. This
section briefly touches on some of the major factors that, if properly implemented, can
have considerable impact on "productivity" in the development process. For that reason,
they should be carefully considered in conjunction with normal process improvements
when searching for innovative solutions to reduce cycle time and cost.
4.2.2.1. Rewards and incentives
Companies are responding to increase.d worker skepticism by giving employees a
bigger stake in the company's success. For example, Pratt & Whitney's North Berwick,
Maine plant recently started a profit-sharing plan for non-union members tied to
efficiency efforts, training, and broader job responsibilities. The plan has resulted in
"breathtaking improvements," said Pratt President Karl Krapek.14 The above quote is an
example of an innovative way in which one UTC business is rewarding employees and
changing traditional compensation systems.
Today, the incentive system within the DMC II continues to foster emphasis on
individual performance, often at the expense of team performance. Effective
implementation of an incentive system that shifts the focus from individual performance
to team performance has the potential to drastically improve S70 development cycle time
and cost. The focus in the DMC II remains on individual monetary rewards and
promotion while neglecting a vast array of alternative reward opportunities.
14 Karl Krapek, "Pratt & Whitney," Hartford Courant, Business Weekly September 1996: A12.
4.2.2.2. Feedback and performance appraisal
Below is an excerpt from the company's Salary Employee Manual which
describes the importance placed on performance ratings.
You are paid on the basis of your performance. Each year your supervisor
evaluates your performance and in accordance with that year's salary program
may determine merit for increase by completing a performance rating. The rating
is used for such purposes as selection for promotion or transfer, and provides a
structural basis for discussing your accomplishments as well as identifying your
training, development and career needs. The rating provides you with the
opportunity to review what is expected of you, assess the past year's activities and
obtain a clear understanding of your supervisor's expectations.1 5
Core Team Members of the DMC II are formally evaluated yearly by the DMC II
manager. As mentioned above, this evaluation determines individual raise increases and
provides feedback for further improvement. The actual evaluation form focuses on six
areas that include: technical expertise, contribution, business relationships, customer
satisfaction, teamwork, organizational skills, compliance, and leadership. Each of the
areas have boxes associated with them where the supervisor is obligated to check boxes
indicating the employees levels of proficiency in each of the areas.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, employees that are co-located in the DMC II, but are
not Core Members still get evaluated by their functional department managers. Ideally,
these managers request information from DMC II Core Members on their employee's
performance prior to rating.
The other tools used for feedback in the DMC II include drawing release
schedules and SALT 24 reports--an Automated Daily Timekeeping System. The drawing
release schedule is used by team leaders and senior managers to evaluate whether the
program is on schedule. The exercise of actually creating a drawing release schedule
remains fairly inconsistent across programs. Generally, however, design release dates are
established through compromise-team leaders attempt to balance engineering manpower
constraints with actual manufacturing need dates. Once again, this traditional style of
scheduling pays little attention to the potential quantity of rework involved after the
'5 "Compensation," Sikorsky Salary Employee Manual, (Unpublished Work: United Technologies
Corporation, 1992) 28.
release of a drawing. More experienced team leaders understand which new designs are
riskier than others and typically develop their drawing release schedules to reflect this
uncertainty.
The SALT report is a tool used by managers to evaluate whether a program is
over or under on budget estimates. Prior to the start of any project, estimates are made
indicating the number of hours required to complete the development project. These
hours are spread across the expected cycle time of the whole project and are carefully
tracked against actual hours spent listed on the SALT report. Team leaders are carefully
evaluated on how well they adhere to their budgets. Obviously, due to this metric there is
a natural tendency for team leaders to focus less on quality and more on keeping their
engineering hours below their estimate.
4.2.2.3. Overtime
Below is another excerpt from the company's Salary Employee Manual:
Exempt employees are expected to work occasional overtime without
compensation. However, if your job requires regular overtime work for an
extended period, you may be put on an approved overtime schedule by your
supervisor. All hours worked, whether compensated or not, are to be input into
the Automated Daily Timekeeping System (SALT 24).16
Most of the programs in the DMC II are typically put on overtime when the DMC
II manager or team leader feels they are in threat of not meeting the aircraft delivery
schedule. In this situation, engineers typically have a great deal of power in dictating
their own overtime schedules. It is common to see some engineers clock considerable
amounts of overtime one week only to take vacation time the following week. Generally,
there seems to be a much stronger degree of commitment from DMC II Core Team
Members than there is from temporarily co-located employees. The sensitivity of the
overtime subject and varying levels of commitment is exacerbated by the ongoing
downsizing effort throughout the company.
Needless to say, truly high-performance project teams include team members who
regularly deliver more than a 40-hour work week to the project. If a few critical tasks
16 Ibid. 26.
demand extraordinary effort, most committed teams are willing to devote a few weeks of
14-hour days to get the job done, often outside of their realm of expertise. However, 60
or 70 hour weeks cannot be expected from most team members for more than a few
weeks without causing fatigue and "burnout."' 7
4.2.2.4. Overlapping job responsibilities and cross-training
One way to increase productivity on a development program is to have a team of
multi-skilled individuals able and willing to take on a variety of tasks to ensure project
completion. In effect, the team would focus all its efforts on the tasks that form the
project's critical path in an effort to reduce cycle time. If the critical path can be usefully
attacked by additional people, the team may choose to temporarily drop some or all other
noncritical tasks in order to ensure timely completion of the critical tasks.
Sikorsky has traditionally been a functional organization with little emphasis
placed on overlapping job responsibilities and multi-talented employees. The traditional
rigidity in its organizational structure is reflected in the following excerpt from the Salary
Employee Manual:
In order to determine the relative worth of the work you are assigned, the
Company uses a thoroughly tested system ofjob evaluation. Each job group
within the Company has a written job description of your duties and
responsibilities. Factors are: education, experience, complexity of duties,
supervision received, errors (potential impact on the Company), contact with
others, proprietary data, mental and visual demand and working conditions. For
those positions with supervisory duties, in addition to the above factors, two other
factors are also included: character of supervision and scope of supervision. Each
of these factors is assigned a degree which rates to what extent that factor is
required to perform the particular job. A numerical value is given to each degree,
and the jobs assigned a grade level and a corresponding salary range."8
Within the DMC II, there are some examples of overlapping job responsibilities
and pockets of excellence where considerable cross-training takes place. However, with
" Bradley J. Smith, Nghia Nguyen, Richard F. Vidale, "Death of a Software Manager," American
Programmer May 1993: 15.
1s "Compensation," Sikorsky Salary Employee Manual, (Unpublished Work: United Technologies
Corporation, 1992) 28.
no formal cross-training plan, individuals have been reluctant to take on additional
responsibilities. Some employees are even hesitant to relinquish their functional
knowledge-an expected consequence in a downsizing environment.
Furthermore, as the DMC II continues to grow with less of an emphasis on team
performance, individuals will become increasingly concerned about their own programs
or narrow job responsibilities at the expense of others. Only those truly committed to the
overall success of the DMC II will share overlapping responsibilities out of career
necessity.
4.2.2.5. Co-location and coordination mechanisms
Coordination among the activities of the different members involved in the
harness development process is required throughout the lifetime of the project and its
effectiveness often determines the success of a program. The need for coordination is a
natural outgrowth of dependencies among tasks."9 Coordination needs also arise from the
inevitable changes in the harness plan caused by unanticipated events and new
information. Mechanisms that the DMC II used to address communication difficulties
and facilitate coordination include meetings, informal communication, and information
systems.
4.2.2.6. Meetings
The primary formal communication mechanism for platform leaders was
meetings. Most projects in the DMC II met formally at least once each week, and some
as many as five times a week depending on the stage of development. Teams located in
the same work area needed fewer formal meetings than those whose members were
geographically separated. In order to minimize the amount of time wasted in meetings,
some teams that held meetings every day met standing up to emphasize that the meeting
was intended to be quick. Other techniques for controlling the length of meetings
included preparing a written agenda, appointing someone to run the meeting, and holding
the meeting at breakfast time. The most successful meetings seemed to be those that
were held at a regular time and place so that no extra effort was expended in scheduling
the meeting and in informing the team of its time and location. Sometimes a simple
change from weekly to daily meetings increased the "driving frequency" of the
information flow among team members and enabled more rapid completion of tasks.
4.2.2.7. Informal communications
Team members engaged in a harness development project often communicated
with other team members dozens of times per day. Many of these communications were
informal; they often involved a spontaneous stop by someone's desk or a telephone call
to gather information. Informal communication was dramatically enhanced with the co-
location of team members and served as an effective mechanism in breaking down
individual and organizational barriers to cross-functional cooperation. This is consistent
with the work of Allen who has shown that communication frequency is inversely related
to physical separation and falls off rapidly when people are located more than a few
meters from one another.20 Figure 4-2 shows this relationship for individuals with an
organizational bond, such as individuals belonging to the same product development
organization. Within the DMC II, electronic mail, and voice mail also provided effective
means of fostering informal communication among people who were already well
acquainted with one another.
9 Karl T. Ulrich and Steven D Eppinger, Product Design and Development (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1995) 274.
20 Thomas J. Allen, Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the Dissemination of
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Figure 4-2: Communication frequency versus separation distance.2 1
4.2.2.8. Information systems
Information systems generally refer to the structured means that teams exchange
information. The most important information system that the DMC II used in project
execution was the development schedule. The more successful projects had a single
person who was responsible for monitoring the project schedule. Team members
generally understand the importance of accurate schedule projections and were
cooperative in supplying this information. Schedule updates were usually displayed in
Gantt chart form.
4.2.3. Improving "quality" in harness development
Overall, its relatively easy to measure a development projects' "quality." Within
the harness development process, the number of engineering changes occurring after the
start of fabrication is one good measure. A second measure might be the number of
wiring changes required during installation-to include terminations made on the
helicopter because of a lack of length information in design. Lack of information and
unforeseen changes all result in lower quality levels that direct work away from being
complete to "undiscovered rework" and "known rework." As a result, harnesses may
cycle four or five times through the "Rework Cycle" before they can be classified as
21 Karl T. Ulrich and Steven D Eppinger, Product Design and Development (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1995) 275.
actually complete. Improvements in quality can be classified as anything that prevents a
harness from traveling through the "Rework Cycle" and having to be touched more than
once by either an engineer or technician.
4.2.3.1. Rule based technologies and 3-D modeling
Recent advances in technology have revolutionized engineering quality levels and
have made many traditional development tools obsolete. Noteworthy success stories
highlighting the benefits associated with 3-D modeling and rule based technologies have
become commonplace. Unfortunately, since the original S70 helicopter design was
developed in 2-D, many of the advantages gained through the use of rule based
technologies go unrealized without considerable 3-D modeling investment.
Studies have shown that 80% of all engineering activity is actually nothing more
than a minor variation of pre-existing practice or procedure-routine work.22 Object
oriented technology has enabled the rapid development and deployment of engineering
applications by automating these routine operations. Combining this technology with a
methodology for acquiring and structuring knowledge enables engineers to rapidly
generate new designs directly from functional specifications. With this technology,
market-leading companies worldwide in the aerospace, automotive, industrial equipment,
construction, computers and telecommunications industries are creating customer-driven
product designs, product configuration, and sales proposal in minutes, not months.
Applications for rule-based technologies are continually evaluated at Sikorsky. In fact,
the manufacturing engineering department deemed RBT to be so important that they have
assigned it as a special project within their department.
4.2.3.2. Prototype/mock-up design
Given the challenges and investment required for developing an effective rule
based technology for the harness development process, alternate solutions that eliminate
rework must be examined. One such solution is the use of mock-up designs to acquire
accurate length and interference data. Taking the time up-front, during the generation of
22 "The ICAD System," Concentra Corporation, 1995.
stick and length data stage of harness development, to conduct a mock-up will result in
less work being done on the aircraft during installation. The tradeoff, however, is to
determine whether this increased engineering effort is less expensive than the current
manufacturing effort-a constant struggle between the DMC and DMC II. This struggle
is exacerbated by the current performance metrics used by each organization.
4.2.4. Factors that will facilitate "rework discovery" in harness development
No matter what the quality improvement effort and impact, undetected errors and
rework cycles are unavoidable in harness development as they are in other complex
development projects. When rework is generated, however, it has its most destructive
effect on the whole project when it is in the state of "undiscovered rework.""23
Discovering the rework earlier and faster removes much of the program-wide disruption,
especially the delivery schedule impacts. Studies have shown that the value achieved by
accelerating the detection of undiscovered rework is indeed non-linear.24 Cooper suggests
that lowering the rework discovery time in an organization is most leveraged in
improving schedule performance when quality is not at extremely low or extremely high
levels. At extremely high quality levels, there is not as much room for improvement of
schedule performance. And in the stages of a development when extremely low quality
prevails, rapid rework discovery ends up subjecting the execution of the discovered
rework to the same low-quality conditions that caused it to cycle in the first place. In
such conditions it is best to work first on quality enhancement practices and systems, then
to accelerate the benefit with rework discovery enhancements.
With improved rework discovery mechanisms in place, team leaders can also
attain a much more accurate assessment of real project progress and not be misled by
perceived project performance--a phenomenon described by Cooper as the "90%
Syndrome," where for a prolonged time project managers report to executives that their
effort is 90% complete when only 75% or less is really done. This reporting continues
until, after much disappointment and cost, 90% is finally achieved and the project moves
23 Kenneth G. Cooper, "The Rework Cycle: How it Really Works," PMNETwork. February 1993.
24 Ibid.
on to completion. The "Rework Cycle" explains the systemic causes of the "90%
Syndrome" through varying degrees of quality and rework discovery. According to
Cooper, projects that have low quality levels and long rework discovery times exhibit the
following characteristics:
1. A large, long-lasting gap between real progress and that which is perceived.
2. A significant gap that still persists in the final stages of the project.
3. Great uncertainty in the size of the gap.
4. A point of maximum uncertainty about real progress late in the project.
Figure 4-3 depicts a progress ramp of real progress vs. perceived progress when
quality is assigned a value of 0.2 and rework discovery is 0.75.
Percent of Work Actually
Complete
Percent of Work Perceived Complete
Figure 4-3: Percent of work actually complete vs. Percent of work perceived complete with low
quality and long rework discovery. 25
Successful initiatives to improve rework discovery will change the "culture"
of the organization. Rather than mandate levels of quality, management will have to
influence quality indirectly through that which they can control, or more directly
influence--interim schedule targets, staffing, monitoring systems, and testing practices.
Within the DMC II, some of the factors which can improve "rework discovery time"
include: 1) Cultivation of a more collaborative work environment which encourages
early detection of rework, 2) Early and improved review of EPATS design by
knowledgeable team leaders, 3) Installation and test of harnesses as soon as possible in
the build plan, and 4) Assignment of proactive management with a thorough
understanding of the entire development process.
4.3. Pursuit of incremental and radical improvement in the harness
development process
Ideally, the best working environment would be one in which there is sufficient
time and resources available to devote to large scale process improvement-considerably
challenging in a downsizing environment. This activity, the fourth step in the
methodology, represents a collaborative effort to improve "productivity" and increase
"quality" as applied to the "Rework Cycle." This thesis argues that two teams should be
devised to study both incremental and radical improvements concurrently. The radical
process team should confront such issues as supplier lead time and costs, major
technological improvements, managerial selection and training, and quality assurance.
The formation of the DMC II in and of itself was a severe radical change that had taken
place prior to the start of this study. Due to manpower constraints within the DMC II,
however, formation of radical process improvement teams for further radical change was
limited. Consequently, this step in the methodology focuses on incremental
improvements to the current harness development process. The incremental process
improvement path started with the construction of a process flow diagram and the
development of a simulation model to aid in decision making. The following sections
will briefly discuss the advantages of simulation over traditional cycle time measurement
tools.
4.3.1. Traditional cycle time measurement tools
To address the issue of product development cycle time, there is a fundamental
need for analytical tools and methods to describe and plan development projects. One
traditional tool used to manage and schedule projects is a Gantt chart, a bar graph which
maps activities on the vertical axis against time on the horizontal axis. A second tool is a
PERT (project evaluation and review technique) diagram, which describes all the
activities related to a project with a network of nodes representing the activities and
25 Kenneth G. Cooper, "The Rework Cycle: Benchmarks for the Project Manager," Project Management
Journal XXIV, March 1993.
connecting arcs representing the precedence of all the activities. This section describes
how Sikorsky utilized these traditional tools.
Gantt Chart: The primary engineering project management tools currently
being used at Sikorsky are Gantt charts and computerized scheduling systems to track
start and completion dates. The steps in the engineering process are defined down to the
task level and labor estimates are collected from each engineering group. The labor
estimates are aggregated to define the length of time required for major functional
activities, and these activities are drawn on Gantt charts. For each function, milestones
are set for each engineering team, primarily indicating when all drawings, models or
specific data must be released to a downstream group. All inter-group activities, where
one group needs a special piece of information from another group, are negotiated and
agreed upon and that date is added as a target completion date.
From this system, many levels of Gantt charts are created to track the project.
The project as a whole is charted across the entire engineering department. Individual
engineering leaders, such as manufacturing engineering, create their own Gantt charts.
Finally, groups such as the harness planners will chart their own activities and milestones.
These Gantt charts, drawing release schedules, and the MRP II system constitute
the primary tools used to drive the system. Each manufacturing back shop is provided
with a MRP II generated report, either for a single customer or for all customers, of what
is due to be released. While the project is in progress, the scheduling system is used to
track the performance of each department. When each model or task has been completed,
that information is entered in the system. Thus, on a daily basis reports are generated for
each department detailing whether it is ahead or behind on a single customer or on all of
its customer tasks. This drives the day to day scheduling down to the engineer or
technician level and serves as the primary tool by which each team or department is
measured and rewarded.
The Gantt Chart provides an effective driver and monitor of a very large scale
engineering project, but it also has a number of disadvantages in the following areas:
* Size: Using Gantt charts requires a large overhead in time and people. Within
the DMC II, there is an individual permanently assigned to record and track data. While
this person works closely with the engineers, he is not directly involved in the
engineering process. Therefore, a significant amount of time is spent by the engineer and
the scheduler satisfying the requirements of the scheduling system.
* Complexity: As the scheduling tool tries to aggregate thousands of individual
tasks it begins to drive the engineering activity on a very macro level. Therefore, it is not
a very sensitive tool for anticipating problems which are more than a few weeks into the
future. It often reports backlogs of work much too late, once groups have already fallen
behind and have begun missing release dates.
* Incentives: Often the scheduling system enforces the wrong incentives.
Individuals are judged by how well they meet a schedule that is based on their labor
estimates. This encourages them to be quite conservative when committing to a schedule.
Once the dates are established, individual engineers work to those dates, often holding
onto finished work until it is required by the schedule. Finally, by forcing groups to meet
dates that were often estimated a year in advance, the schedule encourages the release of
incomplete data that causes disruption and rework later in the process.
* Design: The adherence to a detailed scheduling system breaks customer design
into two stages. Within the first month, all the engineering groups spend just enough
time on the design to estimate their future costs. This estimation activity follows the
same sequential design process, in which each group's estimate is based on, and waits
for, the upstream groups' estimates. That customer's design is then set aside until it
reappears in the sequential design process, which may be up to one year later. Some
engineers feel that the time it takes to estimate what they are going to do sometimes takes
as long as the final engineering effort, thus doubling the amount of work they have to do.
This list of the faults of the scheduling system is not meant to diminish the value
it provides to Sikorsky. In fact, this system effectively serves as the integrator and driver
of an extremely complex engineering project. Rather, the point to be made is that
dependence on this scheduling system makes the task of reducing development cycle time
more difficult.
The development process for an individual customer is described by the Gantt
charts that are taken directly from the scheduling system. The cycle time for that
customer is typically calculated directly from these Gantt charts based on a Critical Path
Method (CPM), i.e. adding up the longest path of functional activities to provide an
estimate of the total amount of time required to complete the customer design. The size
and complexity of the scheduling system creates an inaccurate picture of tasks that need
to be performed, and then the system forces the groups to adhere to that picture, while
adding non-value activities to the process. Accepting this assumption leads to the
conclusion that the scheduling system is not an effective tool to define, much less
understand and improve, the true cycle time of the development process. Therefore, the
first step to reducing the development cycle time is to develop a better description of the
process itself, a description which will more accurately define the amount of time for the
sub-tasks and, in aggregate, the cycle time of each customer.
PERT diagrams: Another common tool used to describe design processes is the
traditional PERT style diagrams. PERT diagrams define a network of activities or tasks
tied to specific groups of people. The difference between this representation and the
GANTT chart is that the PERT chart clearly shows the precedents of tasks. A PERT
diagram is one of the primary tools used by the Sikorsky process improvement or
"kaizen" teams to understand their processes. The following is a relatively detailed






Figure 4-4: Process flow diagram of harness development process.
Without computer simulation, however, it is difficult to use PERT diagrams to
define the cycle time of a complex process like the one shown above. It is imperative that
the concepts of feedback and iteration loops be included since they significantly affect
cycle time.
4.3.2. Queuing network model of wiring harness development
A slightly different interpretation of the standard PERT diagram is to define each
node as a specific resource available for each task activity or set of jobs. A customer
project enters the network and starts with the first task to be performed by the first work
station. As each set of jobs is completed, the next steps can be performed by the same
work station or the next station in the system. Finally, once all the jobs have been
completed, the project exits the system. The total cycle time is defined as the length of
time the project is in process in the system.
A simpler version of the process flow diagram shown in Figure 4-4 is shown as a
queuing network diagram in Figure 4-5.
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Figure 4-5: Queuing harness development network
By adding queues before each node, an additional time element is defined,
separating the time required for each individual job into queue time and processing time.
This enables the diagram to reflect the reality of limited engineering resources, not only
regarding the length of time a task requires once it is in service, but also the period of
time each task must be delayed while resources are focused on other tasks and projects.
Queuing models have long been the subject of operations research, used to
address such problems as inventory and production control. The introduction of
automated manufacturing systems focused the development of queuing models on the
problems of resource contention between production equipment. In addition, the
modeling of computer systems and data transmission systems has greatly increased the
understanding of complex queuing networks. All these traditional applications have
relied on queuing models to help design and improve the performance of systems of
machines and equipment.
The concept of using queuing networks to model design activities is well
described in the work of Adler et al., where the authors use a stochastic processing
network to model product development projects. They define each project as a series of
jobs that are represented by a pool of engineers or technicians who are able to perform a
subset of the jobs. Each work station is preceded by a queue, thus an existing job in the
system is either being processed by that work station or is waiting in the queue while the
resources of that work station are occupied with other jobs.
This model fits very well with the type of product development activity that is
currently performed by the DMC II with respect to harness development. Each helicopter
order breaks down into a relatively uniform set of jobs and follows the same sequence
through the DMC II. For example, if a helicopter requires some modification of 40
wiring harnesses across 6 defined areas of the aircraft, the modification can be broken
down into 40 jobs flowing through the queuing network.
When the customer order enters the network, the first 40 jobs appear in the
Generate Wiring Schematics queue. As those jobs are finished, the EPATS design jobs
enter their queue. Thus the process defines the order of the jobs entering the system and
each set of jobs appears in the appropriate queue when the corresponding upstream jobs
have been completed. When all the jobs have been serviced, the work for that customer
is complete and the customer order exits the network. The total amount of time that the
customer order is in the network constitutes the wiring harness development cycle time
for that customer.
When working specifically to reduce product development time, a true
understanding of the nature of time is crucial. Clearly, queue time exerts an effect and
must be accounted for. Elements such as feedback and iterating loops are also
significant. Prioritization of tasks must be considered. Both sequential and parallel
processing of jobs across functional groups must be explored. Finally, when searching
for a solution, availability of resources must be examined and tied to the arrival of work
in the different stages of the process. The queuing network provides a model which can
characterize all of these important elements.
4.3.3. Queuing network simulation tool
4.3.3.1. Purpose of simulation
An analytical model can be used in a number of ways to help in a process
improvement project. The definition of the model can be used to develop a basic
understanding of the significant elements of the current process. A more significant
application of the model is to use it to estimate the potential effects of specific changes.
The model can be used to define the relationship between the inputs to the system and the
performance of the system.
Queuing network theory offers two alternative techniques. The first approach is
to use analytical formulas such as Little's and Jackson's Theory to define specific
relationships between arrival rates, service time and queue time of the subcomponents of
the system or the system as a whole. A second approach is to use a computer simulation
to experiment with changes in both the input conditions and the specifics of the system.
In the Adler study, stochastic networks were used to model product development
processes because they were able to characterize the processing time and inter-arrival
time using a defined set of probability distributions. In this study, the harness jobs'
service times could be characterized using a probability distribution but the inter-arrival
times of the customer orders were somewhat deterministic. The start of a project, as in
many product development departments, is timed to coincide with the freeing up of
resources. Thus the harness development process cannot be modeled as a memory-less
system. Each project is selected based on the current projects in progress, the size of
current and proposed projects, and the resources available. For example, if the DMC II
were overworked with projects, the functional design groups would get some of the work.
The deterministic nature of this process leads away from using analytical techniques,
since many of those techniques can only be applied to memory-less systems.
For the purposes of this process improvement project, there are additional reasons
why simulation is the more applicable approach. The purpose of the simulation exercise
goes beyond just understanding the specific relationship between the process and cycle
times. As a more flexible tool, it can be used to investigate more abstract questions such
as what is the degree of queue time versus processing time or what is the effect of rework
due to late changes? In addition, it provides a much more intuitive tool because it is
based on basic elements that people involved in the process come in contact with every
day, i.e. specific jobs, resources, and relationships. As such, it can be used to effectively
demonstrate new concepts and alternative processes. Furthermore, a simple and intuitive
analytical tool is essential to get the buy-in for change from both the team members and
upper management.
A simulation program was used as a tool to help explain the current process and
explore alternatives to the process and the underlying model. Early on in this project, it
was recognized that it was only a single tool that had to be integrated with other forms of
analysis, thus it did not become an end in itself. Once the current model and process had
been simulated, the simulation tool was used to explore very specific question such as:
what are the effects of a different level of parallel flow; what is the effect of transferring
individual jobs from one group to another; and what is the effect of a broader skill set?
Within the body of this thesis, the simulation results will be used to clarify the
specific issues under discussion. In order to effectively use the simulation results, the
following section will define the primary elements used in the simulation and then
present the results of modeling the current process.
4.3.3.2. Simulation details
The simulation was developed on a PC program called Arena, produced by
Systems Modeling Corporation. This program, originally designed for production
simulation, provides a generic set of modules to define a queuing network of
manufacturing work cells. These modules include machines, buffers, and parts.
Renaming these elements allows the use of this simulation package to define the general
elements of the wiring harness development process within the DMC II. Instead of
machines, there are engineers and technicians. Instead of parts, there are specific jobs
such as creating a 2-D tool for wire lay-up. Instead of part buffers, each job sits in a
queue (or computerized in-basket) until an engineer or technician is free to work on it.
Work stations: In this simulation, work station modules represent the first seven
of the nine major steps in the harness development process: Generation of wiring
diagrams, EPATS input, production illustration, harness manufacturing planning, wire
cutting, 2-D T105 tool construction, and harness fabrication. For purposes of the
simulation, EPATS input and production illustration are combined into one work station
and the simulation ends at the fabrication stage of harness development. The number of
people in each work station remains fairly consistent from program to program.
Typically, in the DMC II, there are one or two people who generate the wiring diagrams
for each program. In some instances these diagrams are actually provided by a customer
or supplier and hence no work is required at all. There is usually one engineer who
completes all of the EPATS input for all the harnesses in a program. Similarly, there is
usually one manufacturing engineer who does all of the harness planning for an entire
program and one tool fabricator who constructs all of the 2-D T105 tools for all of the
programs. All wires are cut and coded by one of two Capri wire cutting machines at
Sikorsky's Avionics Systems Center (ASC) in Shelton, CT. These machines have the
capability to automatically download wiring details such as wire length, type, and routing
information directly from the EPATS system. Harness fabrication, staffed by hourly
technicians, varies considerably from month to month depending on workload. During
my stay manpower ranged from 5 to 10 people over primarily one shift. For the purposes
of the simulation, it is assumed that no person is on task all of the time, since they devote
a portion of their time to breaks, training, and other side projects. Therefore, using a
standard resource estimate, each person in the simulation works 33 hours out of a 40 hour
week. For the remaining 7 hours, randomly dispersed throughout the week, the simulated
worker sits idle, interrupting the current job or waiting to pull a new job from a queue.
Jobs: Jobs represent the work done at each work station to satisfy a customer's
design. A single customer order enters the system when a customer contracts to buy a
new helicopter. From that one customer order, a specified quantity of different type jobs
enters the system to be worked by the appropriate work stations. These jobs represent a
single task or aggregation of a few tasks that an engineer or technician must process.
Besides type and customer number, each job has an attribute called process time that
defines the length of time it must be worked on at a specific work station until it is
considered to be complete. Once a job passes through the last work station, it departs the
system. When all the jobs associated with a customer are complete, the customer leaves
the system signifying the overall project cycle time.
The job types were selected by examining each work station's activity related to a
specific customer, and narrowing down the work to the single worker level. For example,
the EPATS design work station defined wiring harnesses from system diagrams and input
this data into the Electrical Planning and Tooling System (EPATS). Once the definition
of jobs were defined, the average number of jobs for each customer could be calculated
from the history of the first few customers. For the EPATS work station, the average
number of harnesses that changed (either modified or created) translated into the number
of harness engineering change orders for each customer.
Once these job types were defined, the mean and distribution of their processing
times were calculated for each work station. It was found that a single mean and
distribution was not sufficient to define all harnesses that passed through a work station.
In the case of an EPATS input job, approximately 20% of the harnesses touched per
customer had to be created from scratch as opposed to being modified from an old design.
The new harness jobs had a much larger mean service time and a different distribution.
Also, the size of the harness greatly affected its processing time. Consequently, each
work station had specific job types associated with it, and the processing time for each
job type varied depending on the size and complexity of the harness.
The specific job types at each station are outlined in Table 4-1. The only work
station that has more than one job type is Harness Manufacturing Planning. In that case,
the internal process was broken into three sub-jobs because these different jobs caused a
release of work to the Wire Cutting and 2-D T105 Tool Construction work stations at
different times.
Work station Job type Harness size & Description
complexity
Generation of wiring Create wiring diagram Main, Main revision, Definition of the
schematics Medium, Medium revision, contents of a single
Small, Small revision wiring harness
EPATS input Create harness engineering Main, Main revision, Computer input of wire
change order Medium, Medium revision, code, type, and routing
Small, Small revision information
Generate sticks Create stick diagram Main, Main revision, Engineers draw stick
Medium, Medium revision, diagram of harness
Small, Small revision lengths and connector
locations
Manufacturing - Create assembly operations Main, Main revision, Manufacturing
engineering planning sheets Medium, Medium revision, engineers create
- Create 2-D harness diagram Small, Small revision detailed instructions for
(T101) harness fabrication
- Create harness assembly
workbook
Wire cutting Cut and code wire bundles Main, Medium, Small Wires are automatically
cut by downloading
EPATS data
2-D TI105 tool Construct T105 tool Main, Medium, Small 2-D T101 drawing is
construction attached to plywood to
fabricate harness
Harness fabrication Fabricate wiring harness Main, Medium, Small Harness is fabricated on
T105 by using the
assembly workbook
Table 4-1: Simulation Job Types
Rework jobs: The customer jobs defined above in no way represent all the work
in the harness development process. They represent the work that normally flows from a
customer order if there are no iterations in design, changes to the customer order, or
errors in the initial design discovered later in the development process, i.e. elements that
are depicted by the "Rework Cycle." All this additional activity clearly has a significant
effect on the availability of resources and therefore on cycle time. In order to characterize
this effect, a new type of job was added to the simulation that was called "rework."
Rework jobs represent work that would appear with little notice and have a higher
priority than the current customer being worked since they are associated with an earlier
customer that has a more immediate delivery date.
To model the detailed cause and effect of rework jobs, a relatively simple addition
was made to the model. By questioning each of the work stations, it was found that
roughly 3/4 of the jobs being worked in the planning, wire cutting, or tool construction
stages were the initial customer jobs; the other 1/4 were some form of rework job. In
addition, rework jobs had approximately half the processing times of the initial customer
jobs.
Queues: When a job for a specific work station enters the simulated harness
development system, it enters a queue for that work station. Each work station has one
queue, that handles both rework jobs and normal jobs. In the simulation, as soon as a
worker is free, the job with the highest priority in the queue goes to that worker. Priority
is based on rework jobs and customer order number. If there is no rework job, the first
normal customer job is pulled and processed. For example, all of customer #2's jobs are
serviced first-in-first-out (FIFO), but if a customer #1 job appears, it goes in front of all
customer #2 jobs already in the queue.
Stopped jobs: For most jobs in the simulation, once they are pulled from the
queue, the worker will process the job for the'entire service time. In the real work
stations, the engineers and technicians do not always have the luxury of working a single
job until it is complete. Often, the job is interrupted by external changes or by rush jobs
that require immediate attention, or the job has to be put aside due to incomplete
information or parts shortages. The percentage of stopped jobs varies from work station
to work station, ranging from 5% to 50%. This phenomenon is simulated by tagging the
appropriate percentage of customer jobs for each work station as stoppers. If ajob is
designated as a stopper, it is pulled from the work station's queue, as usual, but it will
only be in service half the required time. It is then placed back into the queue, behind the
other jobs of the current customer. When it again advances to the front of the queue, the
stopped job is pulled once again, completed and finally released from the system.
4.3.3.3. Simulation input and output
While there were many variables that made up the simulation, a number of key
inputs were used to tune the current model and examine alternatives. These included:
1. Customer size: Number of jobs associated with each new customer, with the
service time per job defined by a set of means and distributions.
2. Customer arrival rate: How often a customer enters the system. In the
current model, it was set at one customer arrival every three months.
3. Resources: Number of people in each work station.
4. Rework jobs: Number of rework jobs and their service times.
The primary output of the simulation was the cycle time of the customer order and
of each individual job type. Each customer's jobs were carefully tracked, recording
across the life of the customer how many jobs of each type had been completed, were
currently in process, or were waiting in a queue for service. Monitoring the queues for
each work station showed where backlogs were building and the length of time required
to reduce those backlogs.
4.3.4. Current model simulation results
The results for the current process and model were examined on a customer level
and a work station level. At the customer lev'el, the cycle time was defined as the time
between the original order date and the date that all the harnesses were completely
fabricated. The time required to install the harnesses into the helicopter was not
considered. With the existing customer arrival rate and size, the simulated cycle time
averaged 6.8 months. This included the time from initial customer arrival until the first
wiring diagram job was available, which represented the time required to get the
information from the external groups to the design engineers generating the wiring
diagrams.
The work flow of a single customer across five of the work stations is graphed in
Figure 4-6. It clearly demonstrates the sequential nature of the work flow. Each line in
the graph represents the completion of jobs for one work station associated with a single
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Figure 4-6: Completion ofjobs for a single customer.
It can be seen that the Generate wiring diagrams work center works almost
completely in isolation, with delays between when they finish a job and when the EPATS
designers start to design harnesses. This is due to the need for several different system
diagrams before the start of harness design. While not accurately reflected in the
simulation, there is a clear lag between the start of harness planning and the completion
of EPATS design. This lag is due to the need for accurate routing and length information
for all newly designed harnesses. This often requires significant engineering judgment
and experience in estimating wire lengths and pinpointing the exact locations of new
equipment. Lack of information and experienced personnel can create large delays and
uncertainty between EPATS design and harness planning.
Examining the arrival of work for each work station provides insight to the delays
between stations. Figure 4-7 represents the arrival of work for a single customer into the
queues of each work station. Each line represents all the hours for a single customer as it
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Figure 4- 7: Backlog of hours per person per work station.
The hours have been standardized across the work stations by dividing them by
the number of people in each work station. The worst backlogs occur at the EPATS
design and generate stick work station. In the space of one month, a huge backlog of
close to 300 hours per person builds at this station, which is more than twice the amount
of the next largest backlog .
Backlogs relate directly to the queue time of the jobs at each work station. If all
work arrives in large batches, the jobs at the end of the queue must wait for the backlog to
clear and are even more delayed by the arrival of higher priority rework jobs. As Figure
4-8 illustrates, the amount of time the customer's jobs wait in a queue ranges from 64%
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Figure 4-8: Average queue times and touch times of eachjob type as a percentage of the total
time in the system.
When deciding on the validity of the simulation model, it is important to




predict the usage of resources or the completion of specific projects. Rather, it was meant
as a tool to understand and communicate the current harness development process and to
estimate the relative effects on cycle time resulting from changes in the process. Once
the relationships between the different work stations had been established, the current
simulation was then used as a baseline to compare the effects of proposed changes. In
addition, the dominance of queue time over touch time in the current system supports the
original hypothesis that this study required a tool that could separate the two different
time elements.
4.4. Integrate findings, implement change and refine harness
development
Ideally, at this stage of the cycle time reduction methodology there should be two
complete proposals for process improvement-one requiring radical change, the other
incremental process improvement. Both proposals were attained through the aid of cycle
time reduction tools such as cross-functional teams and queuing network simulation.
Underlying these two separate proposals are the systemic forces affecting harness
development discussed in Section 4.2 and explained by the "Rework Cycle." These
include variables, often separate from process improvement recommendations, which
accelerate or eliminate work through the "Rework Cycle" by impacting manpower,
productivity, quality, or rework discovery.
This stage of the methodology requires the integration of both proposals with the
systemic forces affecting the "Rework Cycle." Chapter 5 will detail the two specific
proposals attained through incremental and radical process improvement and will discuss
their feasibility. Chapter 6 will then integrate these proposals into a practical
implementation plan which incorporates elements of the "Rework Cycle." As discussed
in Chapter 2, the final transition to a successful implementation plan must also
accomplish the following goals:
1. Gain acceptance at all levels of the organization.
2. Gather momentum for implementing change.
3. Gain commitment of upper management to support the change.
4. Create change agents who accept personal responsibility for making the
change happen.
These goals, in fact, underlie every step in this exercise, and many of the earlier
activities should have laid the ground work for a transition from studying the problem to
implementing a solution.
5. Incremental and radical process improvements
The cycle time reduction effort for the harness development process was closely
examined by a newly appointed process owner (a DMC II Core Team Member), and
myself over a seven month period while four development programs were going on
concurrently. We examined the process in great detail and implemented numerous
incremental changes to improve cycle time. Furthermore, we explored several more
radical process improvements that will require organizational changes within the DMC II.
This chapter will outline the approach we took to identify both radical and incremental
process improvements and will discuss their feasibility.
5.1. Efforts to achieve cycle time reduction through process
improvements
As stated in Chapter 2, this thesis makes the assumption that the steps and
methodologies used to create incremental change are different than those needed to create
radical change. Many of the steps needed for incremental improvement are described in a
large body of TQM and continuous improvement literature. The more recent trend of
reengineering has differentiated itself by proposing methods aimed strictly at creating
radical change. Many of the concepts and methods from both these movements were
used to guide cycle time reduction for the DMC II harness development process.
Prior to the start of the process improvement effort it was critical to gain a
clear understanding of the development environment described by the "Rework Cycle."
This provided valuable insight as to where to focus improvement efforts and gave all
team members a shared mental picture of the system within which they worked. Since
harness development was by far the most iterative design mode in S70 derivative
development, there were several ways that development cycle time could be accelerated.
Smith and Eppinger recommend that teams consider two general strategies: faster
iterations and/or fewer iterations through the rework cycle.26 They suggest that faster
iterations can be achieved by introducing the following process improvements:
1. Computer-aided design systems which accelerate some of the individual
design tasks.
2. Engineering analysis tools such as simulation techniques which reduce the
need for time-consuming prototype/test cycles.
3. Information systems involving database management and networking
software which facilitate rapid exchange of technical information among
individuals on the design team.
4. Removing extraneous activities from the iterative process.
Similarly, Smith and Eppinger suggest that fewer iterations can be achieved
through:
1. The improved coordination of individuals whose work depends on one
another.
2. The co-location of team members responsible for tightly coupled activities,
allowing faster and more frequent information exchanges and quicker
resolution of conflicting issues.
3. The minimization of team size, which allows a core set of individuals to work
more efficiently.
4. The proper specification of interfaces, allowing for reduced need for
interactions between individuals and teams within the development process.
5. The use of engineering models capable of predicting performance along
multiple dimensions, eliminating the need for separate analyses.
The improvements which create faster iterations primarily involve shortening the
times for each task by improving productivity, or by reducing the rework discovery rate.
The improvements for achieving fewer iterations primarily involve changing the rework
quantities by improving quality.
26 Robert P. Smith and Steven D. Eppinger, "Identifying Controlling Features of Engineering Design
Iteration," Working Paper #3348, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1995.
5.1.1. Incremental process improvements
The drive for incremental process improvement was continuously ongoing over
the seven month study, and focused on detailed changes to the current process. This
effort was carried out through an existing team of functional representatives. Each
member was primarily responsible for developing improvements to his or her internal
processes and negotiating improvements with immediate customers or suppliers. At the
end of the study, this activity was still ongoing and is expected to continue indefinitely.
Over the seven month study several process improvements did emerge, but the existing
functional structures and roles remained the same. The following sections outline the
approach that the DMC II took in obtaining incremental process improvements.
5.1.1.1. Documenting the existing process
The first step in identifying incremental process improvements was to develop a
clear understanding of the current process. This task took several months and, among
other purposes, served to bring different functional members together as a team. Each
functional representative was encouraged to document a process that would have the
shortest possible cycle time.
Out of this initial phase of study, we created the following process improvement
tools:
1. Process flow diagrams of the current process.
2. Receivable and deliverables for each major task in the process.
3. Identification of all mechanisms for transferring information between groups.
4. List of critical assumptions.
5.1.1.2. Breakdown problem
Brainstorming and integrating ideas within a large team is difficult, especially
when starting from the detailed process definition. Therefore, sub-teams were created,
each focusing on some division of the harness development process. An appropriate
method to divide the problem is to create a single sub-team for each major deliverable of
the development process. For example, use one team to focus primarily on EPATS
improvements, and another to focus solely on T105 construction improvements. The
participants in each sub-team should only represent the functions that are the primary
inputs to the deliverable in question.
5.1.1.3. Brainstorm changes
Each sub-team underwent a brainstorming exercise, focusing on changes that
would speed the development of its narrow deliverable. The purpose of the exercise is to
capture and document as many potential changes as possible in a relatively short time.
The following guidelines were established to govern the incremental process
improvement brainstorming sessions:
1. Start with the customer needs by visiting the end user of each process step.
2. Examine where parallel flow is possible, but if using preliminary information,
identify the risk of rework.
3. Combine, eliminate, and reduce tasks.
4. Clarify mechanisms of passing information.
5. Reduce the total flow time.
6. Reduce feedback loops or try to do it more quickly through fewer layers.
7. Minimize queuing time.
8. Think about dealing with multiple customers at the same time.
5.1.1.4. Integrate and develop incremental preferred process
The preferred process that developed through this exercise encompassed many
incremental changes to the existing development process. This section will attempt to
describe the main improvements in cycle time, without delving too deeply into the details
of the process.
Many of the specific process changes can be characterized by a shift from serial to
parallel work flow and by improved communications. The focus on the receivable of
each function identified the information needed to begin specific tasks within each
function. The upstream functions could often pass a preliminary version of that specific
information, thus allowing each function to start its planning and coordination activities
much earlier.
The changes in the process that resulted in a more parallel work flow include:
1. The wiring development process starts with a series of cross-functional "kick-
off' meetings to define the work statement and identify all the work that
could be done immediately.
2. The wire design process begins immediately with red-lined schematics of the
electrical system. Attempt to use customer furnished drawings as much as
possible to eliminate the time required to transform them to Sikorsky
drawings.
3. The EPATS designers immediately notify planners when there is enough
preliminary data to start manufacturing planning.
4. Wire installation drawings or sticks are completed in parallel with the harness
design.
5. Harness work orders are put into the MRP system as soon as they are
identified as a requirement by engineering.
6. Manufacturing wire-cutting part numbers are defined immediately after the
harness change order has passed through the Configuration Management
Office (CMO).
7. Wire cutting work orders are put into the MRP system immediately after the
manufacturing wire-cutting part number is defined.
8. T105 tools are constructed in parallel with wire-cutting.
The new preferred process greatly increased the use of preliminary data release.
In cases where an integrated design of the entire helicopter must be developed, the
upstream function releases a preliminary version from which the downstream function
could begin its tasks. The challenge with preliminary releases is that the final version
must be released later without causing much downstream rework.
5.1.2. Radical process improvements
The second effort undertaken by the DMC II, consistent with its "thinking out of
the box" culture, was to introduce radical change by redefining the underlying model
upon which the development process and its organization structure were based. Several
brainstorming sessions were conducted within the DMC II which focused on more radical
harness development process improvements. Most of the suggestions can be grouped
into four main categories:
1. Design-planning teams: Reorganizing to focus more on end products rather
than individual functions.
2. Cross-training: Spreading the work more evenly across each functional
group and cross-training to allow specific tasks to be shared by more people.
3. Design philosophy: Developing a more modular design to reduce the
amount of redesigns for each customer.
4. 3-D modeling: Developing a 3-D model of the S70 to allow for more
accurate and timely harness routing information.
5.1.2.1. Design-planning teams
The notion of design-planning teams was slowly gaining popularity within
Sikorsky at the time of this study. Underlying this assumption, was the premise that the
basic element of the development organization should more closely match the final
product, i.e., the helicopter, rather than the different functions involved in the
development process. The design-planning model was defined as consisting of a small
cross-functional team that performed the entire harness development process for each
derivative helicopter program.
This concept had its roots in much of the success that Sikorsky had with its
Comanche Integrated Product Teams, which handled the cross-functional integration that
was needed for its initial development. The underlying purpose of the design-planning
team would be to provide an organizational tool to successfully implement a more
parallel process flow. In order to change the working relationship between the functions,
there had to be a fundamental shift in the focus and responsibility of the teams. What was
still missing in the current organization was a focus on the end product. Between the two
departments, Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering, there was no one person who
had responsibility for the entire harness development process across all nine functions.
Breaking the harness development process into smaller, cross-functional teams that
perform the entire process and share ownership of every aspect of the final harness
development was a means to address the needs of a short flow parallel process.
5.1.2.2. Cross-training
With dedicated teams of functional experts, there will always be periods where
one group is busy while the next is not. In addition, when incremental release is not
possible, there will always be spikes of work moving through each group in a sequential
manner. The ability to work down the queue quickly is a function of how many people
are available to work each kind ofjob. The work of Adler, et. al. suggests the importance
of balancing workloads in a product development environment as a means to reduce cycle
time.27
The concept of merging skills across functions raised resistance throughout the
functional departments within Sikorsky. There were many reasons for this resistance.
First, individuals within functions had required a significant amount of training to
become competent in all aspects of their function. Senior employees had spent ten or
more years developing their expertise. The idea that a single person could become an
expert in more than one function seemed impossible. Also, the idea of merging functions
and skills was extremely threatening because it implied that one or more functions could
be combined, thus eliminating jobs.
5.1.2.3. Design philosophy
Another set of ideas generated in radical improvement brainstorming sessions
suggested that a more modular wiring design, in which off the shelf solutions could be
used for each customer, would have a clear effect on cycle time. This is equivalent of
shrinking the size of each customer introduction by taking away a percentage of the jobs.
This was an especially attractive idea since the existing development process frequently
resulted in the revision of as many as 50% of the harnesses for each new customer.
The concept of modular design, however, contradicted the focus within the DMC
II of satisfying customer requirements. Some of Sikorsky's customers were willing to
pay the extra money for special features, and, consequently, would not have purchased
the helicopter if they had been constrained by a set of standard options. Furthermore, the
existing Electrical Planning and Tooling System (EPATS) used by Sikorsky did not lend
itself to separating and merging individual harnesses to aid in their manufacture.
2 P. Adler, A. Mandelbaum, E. Schwerer, and Vien Nguyen, "From Project to Process Management in
Engineering: An Empirically-based Framework for the Analysis of Product Development," Working Paper
#3503-92-MSA, Sloan School of Management, 1992.
5.1.2.4. 3-D modeling
As noted in Chapter 4, one of the most effective ways to improve the quality of
design and to reduce harness routing rework is to use 3-D modeling in the early stages of
development. For Sikorsky the tradeoff, however, is the significant capital investment
that must be undertaken to incorporate the S70 into a 3-D model. Without a clear
definition of the future sales projection for the S70, it is risky to allocate the resources for
such a capital investment. The use of 3-D modeling would further challenge the DMC II
by requiring additional training to make engineers proficient in its use.
5.2. Integration of incremental and radical process improvements
An analysis of both the incremental and radical process improvement
recommendations led to the same conclusion: in order to reduce development cycle time,
the harness development organization must successfully implement a more parallel
development process. To that end, the harness development organization must achieve
the following goals:
1. Reduce the size and complexity of customer orders, by reducing the scope of
the design and isolating cross-functional interaction within a single team.
2. Focus on the needs of the end product by fostering cross-functional
cooperation driven by common metrics, goals, and schedules.
3. Provide better mechanisms for addressing rework, design iteration, and
modular design.
4. Encourage cross-training and the evolution of the development process.
By the end of this research effort and the subsequent analysis of the benefits of the
proposed changes, some members within the DMC II felt strongly that the design-
planning team model could provide the basic organizational mechanisms needed to
achieve aggressive cycle time improvement goals. And, if properly implemented, the use
of design-planning teams would be a catalyst for additional benefits such as cross-training
and modular design ideas. The next chapter will detail the proposal for the design-
planning team structure that will create a more flexible and responsive parallel design
process.
6. Implementation plan for Design-Planning Teams
This chapter, consistent with step 4 of the methodology, proposes an
implementation plan for design-planning teams to meet cycle time reduction goals in the
DMC II. The final plan reflects a combination of the incremental and radical process
improvement proposals, and is founded on the underlying structure of the development
process described by the "Rework Cycle." If implemented properly, the final, integrated
plan has the best possible chance of success given the current systemic framework. The
main elements of the plan include: the charter for the teams, the team breakdown, the
new roles of the design-planning team members, and the management of the development
process across the teams. A final proposal for the harness development organization
structure will then be described. The material presented in this chapter is based on the
many discussions that were required to define a feasible organization structure that
achieves the goals of the design-planning team model.
6.1. Elements of the Design-Planning team structure
6.1.1. Charter
The charter of the design-planning teams defines the primary responsibilities and
scope of the individual team, as well as the responsibilities that are shared across the
teams. Each team owns the harness development within a given helicopter program.
This ownership includes the following four responsibilities:
1. Definition of Change: Each design-planning team is responsible for
determining all the required wiring changes for their customer order and
scheduling its team members to perform all tasks required to deliver the
required documents and releases to meet the manufacturing schedule. Each
team must coordinate its design and work schedule with other design-planning
teams to ensure downstream departments are not overburdened with peaks of
work.
2. Harness Design: Each team is responsible for every aspect of the wiring
design within the helicopter. This responsibility includes implementing all
design changes, maintaining all documentation, delivering the final products
that meet the manufacturing schedule, responding to and correcting any design
defects, and meeting cost and quality targets. Each team is responsible for
developing entire cost estimates from initial design to final installation and will
be challenged to meet these estimates. This effort will require close interaction
with both fabrication and installation technicians.
3. Manufacturing Plan: Each team must incorporate all design changes into
the manufacturing plan, and provide liaison effort during fabrication and
installation.
4. Cross-training Plan: Each team must switch roles on certain harnesses to
ensure some level of cross-training is taking place. Furthermore, the DMC II
harness development process owner will facilitate lessons learned among the
different teams in the spirit of continuous improvement and best practices.
There are also some responsibilities that must be shared by all the design-planning
teams. The requirement to spread tasks across the product teams is driven by the
necessity to provide manufacturing with a single consistent product. Therefore, there
must be standard parts, tools, and processes that are used across all the teams. Part of the
charter of each team is to provide the resources and cooperation needed to properly
integrate its activities with those of the other product teams.
6.1.2. Team composition
Each harness design-planning team should consist of the platform leader
(preferably one with electrical or avionics background), at least one electrical EPATS
designer, one manufacturing engineer, and one engineer familiar with production
illustration (harness routing). Since most programs keep the same fabrication and
installation technicians on the program from start to finish, it would be valuable to
provide these individuals with frequent program updates and include them in all
improvement brainstorming sessions. If a platform leader is selected who does not have
an avionics or electrical background, it is important to put one of the more competent
EPATS designers on the program.
6.1.3. Team roles
The goals and challenges of a product team are significantly different from those
of the existing functional teams. All the original functional tasks must be performed, but
the need to create a strong cross-functional team redefines the roles of all the team
members. The existing hierarchy of supervisor, engineer, or technician will still exist but
their roles become fundamentally different.
The best analogy of the new role of the platform leader is that of a coach. In this
new team environment, the coach has to focus on the goals of the end products by
fostering and maintaining close cross-functional cooperation within his or her team. This
is especially crucial in a parallel process where functional targets and metrics are much
less defined. The internal metrics that must be stressed in a product team are those that
can be tied to the final product, such as the amount of rework across all functions and the
design errors seen by manufacturing. To achieve vast improvements in those metrics,
problem solving within the product team must focus on the systemic causes of errors, not
by placing blame on individuals. The success of this cross-functional problem solving
and continuous improvement will be dependent on the leadership of the coach.
6.1.4. Harness development management: Standardization and improvement
Moving to autonomous product teams has the potential to raise a number of
questions about maintaining a consistent and common process throughout the entire
harness development organization. It is imperative that the product from the platform
teams remains consistent in detail and quality because each team is supplying a common
customer, the harness shop and the installation technicians.
In addition to incorporating this need for standardization into the team charters, a
Core Member of the DMC II is tasked with the responsibility to oversee quality and
commonality throughout the entire harness development process. The basic concept of
this position is to close the feedback loop between the needs of the manufacturing
customers and the improvement efforts and goals of the product teams. Furthermore, this
individual will be responsible for sharing best practices across teams and implementing a
training development program for all team members.
6.2. Final proposal for harness development organizational structure
The cycle time reduction effort for S70 harness development within the DMC
II resulted in a proposal for the matrixed structure depicted in Figure 6-1. It is considered
a matrixed organization because each harness design-planning team is coached by both
the platform leader and the DMC II harness process owner.
Design-Planning Team Proposal
Figure 6-1: Harness Design-Planning organizational structure.
Both the platform leader and the process owner would be responsible for
providing feedback to the teams on their performance and providing them with
recommendation for improvement. It differs from the existing structure in that the
harness design-planning teams carry more responsibility. As indicated in 6.1.1, each
team now has a "cradle to grave" responsibility for their program as well as the
responsibility to improve the entire harness development system, facilitated by the DMC
II harness process owner. Overall, functional barriers in this structure have been
minimized and emphasis has shifted away from non-valued actions such as protecting
turf, to actions valued by the customer.

7. Organizational barriers to implementing Design-Planning
Teams
In this chapter, I argue that the successful transition to design-planning teams
within the DMC II will depend on the ability of management to lead a large-scale,
difficult change effort in both the technological and social systems within the
organization. Further challenged by the fact that this change will focus on the use of
cross-functional teams in a downsizing environment.
In their work on the organizational complexities that create barriers to enacting
design for manufacturing (DFM) principles, Liker and Fleischer identify an
organization's goals, values, language, and symbols (what they term the organizational
context) as an often overlooked, but critical source of opposition to the adoption of cross-
functional processes like harness design-planning teams.28 Their framework portrays the
organizational context as a set of contingencies that influence the success of
management's cross-functional programs. That is, the success of any cross-functional
program like harness design-planning teams depends heavily on the support of the
broader organizational context, and not just on the specific policies and practices which
accompany the initiative.
This section will analyze organizational context barriers using the three-category
framework (formal organization, political, and cultural) proposed by Liker and Fleischer.
These organizational context barriers will then be supplemented in Section 7.4 by a list of
some specific challenges that teams typically encounter. Together, they describe a vast
array of organizational challenges facing management in its drive to implement cycle-
time and cost reduction in the harness development process through the use of cross-
functional teams.
28 Jeffrey Liker and Mitchell Fleischer, "Organizational Context Barriers to DFM," Integrating Design and
Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992): 135.
7.1. Formal organizational barriers
Functional boundaries still exist between the Engineering and Manufacturing
Engineering organizations, and between the DMC and the DMC II. These rigid barriers
exist primarily in order to facilitate the retention of functional expertise within strong,
independent functional departments. Although the use of cross-functional teams has
increased in everything from helicopter design to manufacturing process troubleshooting,
these teams are essentially parallel, redundant structures in the organization.
The effectiveness of cross-functional teams is limited if they are not used within
an organization with permanent cross-functional structures.29 The absence of any
permanent cross-functional mechanisms impedes the vital horizontal flow of
communication required by the interdependence of tasks in the harness development
process. The tendency to analyze and optimize only a specific, functionally-defined part
of the process is encouraged by the rigid barriers between functions, as is the tendency to
look vertically for solutions to difficult problems. Both present significant challenges for




The implementation of harness design-planning teams in the DMC II could cause
political tension between the Manufacturing Engineering organization and the DMC II.
The use of politics in organizational decision-making is most likely to occur whenever
five conditions are present: important decision issues, interdependence of
responsibilities, conflicting goals, scarcity of resources, and diffuse distributions of
power. 30 The implementation of harness design-planning teams within the DMC II
satisfies all five of these conditions, and political resistance is expected to be strongest in
those organizations positioned to lose significant amounts of power. The political
29 Ibid.
30 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Marshfield, MA: Pitman, 1981): 32.
decision-making process is not inherently bad, and indeed can never be completely
avoided within industrial organizations, but the end result of such a power struggle may
very well be the subordination of the goals of the DMC II to those of the functional
departments.
Harness design-planning teams will also cause political tensions between the
Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering organizations. The historic separation
between the two organizations has already been blurred substantially by the successful
use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), and the implementation of harness design-
planning teams will serve to further reduce the distinction between the two departments.
Because that distinction was what allowed the two organizations to claim large amounts
of organizational power, they will object to further encroachment on what they see as
their organizational turf.
In transforming the structure of an organization, we do not have the luxury of
recruiting a new staff to perfectly fill each slot. The most difficult task that the harness
development organization faces is fitting the existing people into very new roles. This
task is further exacerbated because it is being done in a downsizing environment. The
difficulty in this fit lies in the numbers and the skills of the current workforce. The
number of managers and team leaders may not match that of the new organization. In
addition, the existing workforce may not yet have the skills to step into their new roles.
7.2.2. Career progression
It was argued above that to be effective, the cross-functional relationships
required by harness design-planning teams must be more than just parallel, ad-hoc
structures within the DMC II. But individuals facing permanent assignment to a cross-
functional team are being asked to abandon well-defined functional career paths for
something without nearly as much definition.31 This uncertainty within individuals will
manifest itself as an organizational reluctance to support the concept of cross-functional
harness design-planning teams.
" James P. Womack and Daniel T. Jones, "From Lean Production to the Lean Enterprise," Harvard
Business Review March-April 1994: 95.
7.2.3. Layoffs
Like all defense manufacturers, the company which sponsored this research has
been affected by the recent downturn in the defense industry. In 1996, during the time of
this study, the organization was forced to layoff a portion of its workforce. It now
maintains a workforce of roughly half of what it once had in the mid 1980s. Trying to
obtain employee support for new initiatives during such difficult times is never easy.
When combined with the observation that harness design-planning teams may result in
further reductions in head count, obtaining the necessary employee buy-in will be
challenging to say the least.
7.3. Cultural barriers
Cultural barriers represent a significant challenge for management because they
may be difficult to identify, let alone address. Edward Schein defines culture as "a
pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think,
and feel in relation to those problems.""32 Using the framework and terminology provided
by Schein, organizational members will tend to resist the adoption of harness design-
planning teams because it directly attacks the validity of what has been done for several
decades.
Schein also distinguishes between three levels of culture: artifacts, espoused
values, and basic underlying assumptions. Artifacts are the visible products of the group,
including such attributes as the architecture of its physical environment, language,
technology, products, artistic creations, and published lists of values.33 Espoused values
are those perceptions held within the organization of what ought to be as distinct from
what is. Espoused values will predict much of what happens at the level of artifacts, but
care must be taken to distinguish between what organizational members say and what
they actually do. The third level of an organization's culture, and the one which is most
nEdgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1992) 12.
difficult to change, are the shared basic assumptions. Basic assumptions are solutions
which have worked repeatedly in the past and have been taken for granted by virtually all
organizational members. Behavior inconsistent with these assumptions is simply
considered inconceivable.
During the research period, I identified three significant cultural barriers to the
implementation of harness design-planning teams. At the level of artifacts, using the
framework provided by Schein, there exists a tangible sense in most members of the
organization that their company is the dominant defense helicopter manufacturer in the
U.S. and will be kept alive by the defense department. At the level of espoused values,
an emphasis on meeting schedules has proven so successful in the past that many
operations decisions are made with the sole intent of keeping the production line moving.
Finally, and potentially the most problematic for the implementation of harness design-
planning teams, the deeply-rooted emphasis on defense driven compliance issues.
7.3.1. Complacency bred by military helicopter industry
The company which sponsored this research has historically been a defense
contractor. Their competitive advantage has always been their ability to produce quality
rotory wing aircraft for the military. Barriers to entry in the military helicopter industry
are significantly different than those on the civil side. Capital investment, design
expertise, manufacturing capability requirements and market size all posed significant
barriers for new firms seeking to enter the military helicopter business. Now, Sikorsky is
placed in a difficult predicament as it attempts to shift its focus from the security of
defense contracts to the commercial side of the helicopter industry. The question remains
whether they can make a change like harness design-planning teams quickly and
smoothly enough while there is still a prevailing sense of dissatisfaction with the status
quo.
33 Ibid.
7.3.2. Emphasis on schedule
Meeting the scheduled delivery date has historically taken precedence over those
activities designed to reduce the amount of rejection and rework in the manufacturing
process. This focus on meeting schedule is found in every part of the organization, and
results in shortage meetings, hot lists, quick-response action teams, and parts chasers. All
were designed with the intent to keep the production line moving and to meeting
schedule. The focus will need to shift from an emphasis on meeting schedule to
eliminating non-value added tasks and rework. The DMC II has taken the first step in
challenging its employees to do things quicker and easier.
7.3.3. Defense driven compliance issues
In order to be competitive in the military helicopter industry, Sikorsky had to
design unique management systems. For example, the management systems had to
provide for the extensive qualification and documentation required by both the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the military. This detailed documentation allows for
a failed part to be traced to the specific production lot. In the event of a structural failure
after production, the FAA or military service is able to identify production lots and serial
numbered parts which may be defective. This is only one example of the many unique
management systems required for defense contractors. These systems have traditionally
been quite dissimilar to the commercial helicopter business and have become part of the
culture within Sikorsky. Changing these systems to be more responsive to the
commercial buyers will be a continual challenge within the organization.
7.4. Typical problems that teams encounter
For design-planning teams to be effective, a certain degree of commitment from
senior management must be placed on the development and nurturing of teams.
Restructuring trends in industry over the past decade have emphasized the importance of
eliminating barriers through the formation of teams. Vast research has been done in the
area of teaming, and much has been documented as to what makes teams successful and
not so successful.
Hamel and Prahalad argue that much of the discontent within industry over the
use of teams is founded in how teams are used by companies. Hamel classifies
organizations into two basic corporate "orientations." These orientations correspond to
the numbers above and below the line in any fraction:
The top number, the numerator, he claims is a company's potential for growth,
expansion, core competencies, and new products. He calls this "profit by doing." The
bottom number, the denominator, is the bottom line-cost containment, downsizing,
flattening, delayering, and dehiring. He refers to this as "profit on paper."
Numerator companies have a vision of growing and creating something new that
did not exist before. Denominator companies typically take a more limited view, a zero-
sum picture of mature markets that can never be expanded. As such, numerator
companies embrace teams as a way to leverage growth, while denominator-oriented
companies use the idea of teams to trim the workforce."3 Both numerator and
denominator approaches are legitimate, since most companies pursue both all the time.
Hamel argues, liowever, that problems arise with teams when they are used primarily as a
cost-cutting tactic. No team thrives on being left to its own devices, and when they fail it
is typically because companies have used them solely as a means of trimming middle
management, without giving the new teams the attention, vision, rewards, or clarity that
they need to succeed.
Significant research has been done in the area of teaming. Table 7-1 summarizes
the research of Finley and Robbins and highlights some of the symptoms and possible
solutions to common teaming problems.
* Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, Competing for the Future (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1994).
















Lack of Team Trust
People with private agendas working
at cross-purposes
People don't know what they're
supposed to do, or it makes no sense
Team members are uncertain what
their job is
Teams may be making the right
decisions, but the wrong way
Team is at the mercy of an employee
handbook from hell
Team members do not get along
Leadership is tentative or inconsistent
Leadership has foisted a bill of goods
on the team
The organization is not really
committed to the idea of teams
Performance is not being measured;
team members are groping in the dark
People are being rewarded for the
wrong things
The team knows what to do but will
not do it
The team has been sent to do battle
with a slingshot
The team is not a team because
members are unable to commit to it
Get hidden agendas on the table by
asking what people want. personally.
from teaming
Clarify the reason the team exists:
define its purpose and expected
outcomes
Inform team members what is expected
of them
Choose a decision making approach
appropriate to each decision -
Throw away the book and-start making
sense
Learn what team members expect and
want from one another, what they
prefer, how they differ, start valuing
and using differences
The leader must learn to serve the team
and keep its vision alive or leave
leadership to someone else
Get a better vision or go away
Team for the right reasons or don't
team at all; never force people to team
Crate system of free flow of useful
information to and from the team
members
Design rewards that make teams feel
safe doing their job; reward teaming as
well as individual behaviors
Find out what the blockage is and
eliminate it
Equip the team with the right tools for
its tasks, or allow freedom to be
creative
Stop being untrustworthy, or disband or
reform the team
Table 7-1: Problems that teams typically encounter."
Several of these problems were felt within the DMC II at varying degrees-some
obviously more serious than others. For design-planning teams to be effective, several of
these issues should be addressed and acted on quickly and decisively by management.
" Michael Finley and Harvey Robbins, Why Teams Don't Work (New Jersey: Peterson's/Pacesetters
Books, 1995) 13.
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8. The DMC II process and its applicability to the
construction industry.
This section identifies policies and procedures that the DMC II has adopted that
have proven successful for its development projects. These policies and procedures are
founded on concurrent engineering principles and include: overlapping responsibilities,
unit reward and feedback systems, physical layout changes, redesigned work procedures,
and cultivation of a sense of collective responsibility. These same ideas have wide
sweeping applicability to the construction industry in general.
8.1. Concurrent engineering principles
The DMC II has attempted to eliminate traditional functional silos and create a
new organization-a process complete department-able to perform all of the cross-
functional steps or tasks required to meet customer's needs. To date, the DMC II has
proven successful in the form of lower costs, shorter cycle times, and greater customer
satisfaction.
"Concurrent Engineering," "Design for Manufacturing," "Simultaneous
Engineering," and "Design for Constructability," and other similar phrases have
progressively been used to describe the process whereby organizations have sought to
achieve world class performance in design and manufacturing. Conceptually, the process
of ensuring all constraints are considered in order to achieve a perfect product is very
simple. In practice, it is extremely difficult. Many factors act to resist the achievement
of a perfect product. In an environment where technical complexity is increasing and
development costs are rising, the importance of "getting it right the first time" is stronger
and the pressures for alternative and more effective management of the development
process is critical. The collaborative work environment within the DMC II offers the
prospect of achieving these desirable objectives.
Research has proven the benefit of a design process with considerable concurrent
activity. Conventionally, activities can be viewed serially with one stage being
completed before the next stage begins. There is an implicit assumption that no
downstream activity impinges on the preceding activity. Each department signs off and
passes responsibility on in isolation from the remainder of the product development
process. Often times, changes introduced later in the process due to unanticipated
problems will require additional redesign thereby slowing the entire process.
Moreover, when the impact of change late in the product development process is






Figure 8-1:. Cost of change profile for large projects.36
The logic for concurrent design is therefore one which, while promoting change
and increasing management complexity during the early stages in the process, results in
more robust designs with lower development costs overall. The research of Pearce and
Bodnar has shown that, historically, some 85% of major design product programs have
failed to meet their originally planned dates. And, of the 15% that do, some 80% of the
changes occur in the last 15% of the planned program time.37
The purpose of concurrent activities is therefore to actually encourage changes to
satisfy constraints from all interested parties early in the product development process.
The total number of changes are likely to be the same in such a process, but the overall
cost will be dramatically reduced as illustrated in Figure 8-2. More importantly, the
resulting program is more likely to achieve its planned delivery date.
36 C.M. Pearce and A.A. Bodnar, "People and their Role in the Design Process," Transitions of Mechanical
Engineering Vol. ME20 (1995): 261.
37 Ibid. 262.
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Figure 8-2: The effect of concurrent activities on overall project cost.38
This concurrent engineering process reinforces the notion of investing early to
reap future benefits. This is a concept which is intellectually accepted by managers but
which is not often accepted when faced with the reality of spend authorization and
manpower constraints. Doing design concurrently can lead to higher up front design
costs, although not necessarily more cost for the entire project. It is in the downstream
processes that the benefits will occur.
In seeking to manage and introduce discipline to what could be considered an
intrinsically ill-disciplined activity whereby all constraints are resolved simultaneously,
the DMC II is taking on an enormously complex task-one that can be easily
underestimated by someone not involved in the process. To aid them in accomplishing
this task, the DMC II has attempted to build a collaborative culture among team members
by focusing on overlapping responsibilities, team rewards, physical layout changes, and
redesigned work procedures.
8.2. Overlapping responsibilities
The DMC II made responsibilities overlap by designing jobs with a relatively
broad range of duties and by having a relatively small number of job titles. Moreover, it
attempted to breakdown boundaries between positions by assigning people to multiple
teams, by rotating assignments within teams weekly, and by holding unit wide meetings
to discuss improvements to the process. Over time, I would expect virtually every DMC
II Core Member to be able to perform most of the department's functions.
'3 Ibid. 262.
Designing jobs so that employees can at least partially perform most of the
functions assigned to a department helps create a shared sense of responsibility because
people understand one another's work and thus share a common language and similar
constraints and objectives. More important, if a process-complete department does not
make responsibilities overlap, it will end up with a set of specialized jobs by default and
may inadvertently re-create the same coordination problems and high overhead that
challenge organizations with functional departments.
8.3. Rewarding team performance and providing constructive
feedback
Rewards in the DMC II take the form of bonuses, raises, or nonfinancial
recognition. Rewarding unit performance is important because it prevents team members
from placing their individual or functional needs above customers' needs. For example,
if employees are rewarded for reducing processing times at their individual work stations,
they will probably not feel compelled to examine ways of reducing cycle times at the
places between or outside their workstations. In contrast, employees rewarded for
achieving high levels of customer satisfaction or reduction in the department's total cycle
time are more likely to be motivated to solve what they traditionally would consider other
people's problems.
Progress measurement and sharing were key items that kept the team spirit alive
within the DMC II and formed a common language for measuring effectiveness.
Everyone within the organization concentrated on what was measured, therefore it was
important for management to carefully select those metrics which were relevant both to
the team players and to the customer. Since changes initiated before hardware was
committed was so much cheaper in overall terms to the program, emphasis was placed on
the number of design changes as a key criterion to be measured. This obviously had a
direct impact on the magnitude of rework and how frequently work iterated through the
"Rework Cycle."
8.4. Changing the physical layout
The layout of a work site can either inhibit or promote collective responsibility.
Layouts can encourage people to share information about one another's work and try out
new ideas openly. Special areas for continuous improvement and places for teams to sit
and discuss problems were crucial to team interaction within the DMC II. Such areas
contained data relevant to all the projects, as well as the tools for documenting, analyzing,
designing, and sometimes even building prototypes. This type of area made it easier for
people to analyze problems together, build prototypes, and discuss their individual and
group-developed ideas.
Besides making changes in the physical layout of the facility, the DMC II made
significant use of information technology to coordinate the activities of group members.
Automated mail systems, calendars, and shared databases made for the timely and
efficient transfer of critical information.
8.5. Redesigning work procedures
It was critical that the manager of the DMC II asked employees what they needed
in order to work well together. Moreover, it was equally as important for management to
recognize the constraints and possibilities provided by the existing technology, the work
process, the existing organizational culture, and the organization's strategic mission. The
DMC II's formal and informal work procedures encouraged team members to do the
following three things: share ideas for improvement with people in other disciplines,
involve everyone affected by a decision in making that decision, and help others to do
their work even if it caused their own productivity to suffer. Overall, management made
themselves readily available for informal discussions on improvements to work
procedures, and team members generally felt as though they could discuss problems
freely with management.
8.6. Cultivating a sense of collective responsibility
The future success of the DMC II, will be strongly tied to how well managers
create a collective sense of responsibility. Restructuring by process can lead to faster
cycle times, greater customer satisfaction, and lower costs, but only if the organization
has a collaborative culture. Combining the boxes on the organizational chart alone will
not create such a culture. Overall, within the DMC II, the message came through clearly
that management considered collaboration extremely important, however, cultivating a
sense of collaboration with employees accustomed to their functional lifestyles remained
challenging.
Today, as the DMC II continues to grow, it is confronted with how to socialize
new workers into the DMC II process to ensure a sense of collective responsibility within
the organization. Moreover, as the size and complexity of the DMC II grows, key
engineering team leaders are forced to spend more time managing and less time on value
added engineering tasks. A key determinant of the future success of the DMC II will
undoubtedly be its ability to quickly socialize new members into the collaborative culture
within the DMC II. It is crucial that management does not underestimate the actions
required to transform the way employees behive and work with one another. Simply
changing an employee's work location from a functional unit to a process-complete
department will not cause them to shed their functional mind-sets and integrate them into
a team intent on achieving common goals.
Sparing, but thoughtful use of training had a beneficial effect within the DMC II
and proved to employees that they were valued by the organization. Training also helped
to break tensions by establishing stronger relationships among new and existing team
members. Platform leaders played a crucial role in the DMC II process and the
organization recognized the importance of developing their skills to manage projects
more effectively. The organization also recognized that there could be no substitute for
experience in the platform leader role and made every effort to develop young leaders by
rotating them through these positions. Company financial incentives to pursue advanced
management and engineering degrees were also used as a means to encourage self-
development and improve the overall competitiveness of the organization.
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